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Abstract
Authentication is the secure network architecture mechanism by which a pair of
suspicious principals communicating over presumably unsecure channels assure
themselves that each is that whom it claims to be. The Xerox Network Systems
architecture proposes one such authentication scheme. This thesis examines the
system consequences of the XNS model's unique proxy variant, by which a principal
may temporarily commission a second network entity to assume its identity as a
means of authority transfer. Specific attendant system failure modes are
highlighted. The student's associated original contributions include proposed
model revisions which rectify authentication shortfalls yet facilitate the temporal
authority transfer motivating the proxy model. Consistent with the
acknowledgement that no single solution is defensible as best under circumstances
of such technical and administrative complexity, three viable such architectures are
specified. Finally, the demand for a disciplined agent management mechanism
within a distributed system such as XNS is resoundingly affirmed in the course of
these first-order pursuits.
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1 Introduction and Background
This document satisfies the prescribed role of the thesis report element
of the Master of Science degree requirements under Rochester Institute
of Technology's Graduate Computer Science program. Consistent with
this mission, the discussion to follow details the innovative products
created by the student's particular research and development activity.
The emphasis thereof is largely one of distributed systems requirements
analysis and architecture specification.
A significant element of this report thus lies in Section 2, which surveys
pertinent previouswork. This is comprised of two primary components: a
generic treatment of relevant principles from established literature and
detailed examination of the particular baseline model to be enhanced.
Notably original contributions are provided in this document with
respect to the identification of significant improvement opportunities.
These are presented in Section 3, in association with numerous candidate
models by which they may be realized. Section 4 summarizes the key
contributions of this thesis, as well as potential outstanding tasks. The
remainder of this section introduces the student's topic, describes the
supporting information acquisition methods employed, and presents
notational conventions to be applied hereafter.
This organization is consistent with the guideline presented in the
defined thesis development process given exclusion of its software
project emphasis. 1&
1.1 Problem Statement
Authentication is the secure network architecture mechanism by which a
pair of suspicious principals communicating over presumably unsecure
channels assure themselves that each is that whom it claims to be. The
Xerox Network Systems [XNS] architecture proposes one such
authentication scheme. This thesis examines the system consequences of
the XNS model's unique proxy variant, by which a principal may
temporarily commission a second network entity to assume its identity as
a means of authority transfer. Specific attendant system failure modes
are highlighted. The student's associated original contributions include
proposed model revisions which rectify authentication shortfalls yet
facilitate the temporal authority transfer motivating the proxy model.
Consistent with the acknowledgement that no single solution is
defensible as best under circumstances of such technical and
administrative complexity, three viable such architectures are specified.
The utility of an agent management
mechanism within a distributed
system is challenged in the course of this discussion, as is its architectural
coupling to the authentication
mechanism.
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12 Authentication and Authority Transfer: to Couple or not to Couple?
As vividly demonstrated by the recent "Cornell worm", a key shortfall of
most modern distributed systems is the relative ineffectiveness of their
protection mechanismsJ? This inadequacy has percolated to the top of
those constraining the rate by which such state-of-the-art architectures
have become state-of-the-practice. Even in many of those applications
where distributed systems have made successful inroads, considerable
operating risk must be tolerated as a tradeoff against the immediate
benefits of a distributed organization. This thesis considers a particular
significant element of but one such network protection scheme: the
Xerox Network System's Authentication-by-Proxy mechanism.
To review, protection is a simple case of enforcing a set of rules which
constrain the operations which active system entities [i.e. subjects] may
apply to passive system entities [i.e. objects]. Implicit in this statement is
the fundamental assumption that the identity of each of the principals to
the transaction has been accurately established. The utility in this
knowledge is of the first order in the case of discretionary policies, which
control subject to object access purely as a consequence of identity.
Alternatively, a second-order effect is witnessed in light of mandatory
rules, by which identity is mapped to clearance the ultimate basis of
access control.
Consequently, impersonation is a particularly attractive means of
subverting protection safeguards. The introduction of a distributed
system architecture appreciably shifts the risk/reward profile in favor of
the would-be intruder. This is an unfortunate side-effect of the loosely-
coupled organization generally applied to the underlying networking
media. That is, system administrators intentionally have minimal control
over the equipment configuration comprising the domain for which they
have protection responsibility. Subject to the architecture, distributed
system users are often at liberty to vary any aspect of the node which acts
as their network surrogate including the hardware, the operating system
kernel, and the applications software.
In light of this degree of network configuration freedom, the only
reasonably effective model by which each principal to a transaction may
establish the identity of its prospective partners is through mutual
suspicion. This is the role of authentication mechanisms. A great many
such techniques have been developed given the significance of the
impersonation threat and the subtle complexities of the problem. 2
Complementing authentication as a fundamental theme of this thesis is
that of temporary authority transfer. As in social interactions, it is
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sometimes architecturally convenient to dispatch a third-party to
conduct affairs on behalf of the original authorized party, the
transaction initiator. Of particular note is the fact that the party with
whom the exchange is targeted, the recipient, generally requires proof
of the initiator's delegation of authority to his agent. Such a proxy
represents the agent's right to fully-engage in transactions with
complete responsibility for the resultant effects transferring to the
initiator.
The XNS model to be considered in this thesis achieves temporary
authority transfer through controlled impersonation in the
authentication mechanism. It is this apparent significant inconsistency of
employing impersonation in conjunction with the authentication
mechanism to achieve authority transfer which interests the student. This
thesis is therefore devoted to dissecting the effectiveness of this coupling
in light of complementary system protection considerations.
1.3 Information Acguisition Methods
Exceptionally extensive dedicated research provides a sound foundation
upon which this thesis is constructed. This is a fortunate conseguence of
having charted a direct path towards a thesis concentrated in the area of
distributed systems protection early in the curriculum cycle. Such was the
motivation behind a trilogy of research reports delivered in partial
satisfaction of the reguirements of three separate courses. 2-3,4 |n
succession, this research expanded from the protection primitives
associated with security kernels to encompass secure open systems
developments, concluding with a survey of notable authentication
models. The last of these was specifically intended to establish the
baseline existence of significant prior research activity with respect to
authentication. Section 2 of this report is largely an integration of those
portions of the three original research reports directly applicable to this
thesis.
A considerable lag between completion of the authentication survey and
thesis initiation prompted the incremental need for a library search to
identify subseguent relevant research in June of 1989. No major
information was acguired through this effort, though a series of relevant
articles describing the "Cornell
worm"
appeared in Communications of
the ACM in that timeframe. Ongoing monitoring of trade journals and
dialog conducted within electronic mail-based special interest groups
was another prolific information source extending to the time of this
writing. Of equal currency but parallel subject emphasis is the student's
seemingly insatiable appetite for software engineering literature. This
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avenue unexpectedly yielded the fundamental engineering principles by
which the final architectural modelswere produced.
1.4 Notation
The data flow diagram (DFD) is the primary graphical representation tool
employed to complement narrative text throughout this report. 18 Each
authentication model considered is explained using both of these
communication tools. Message legibility accrues from such reliance upon
consistent notation.
The active entities in the models [i.e. processes], principals and
authentication services, are represented as circles. These are connected
by named vectors [i.e. flows], the labels of which indicate passive
exchanged message contents. Notational liberty has been taken with
respect to DFD conventions in applying numbers to the vectors depicting
message ordering as an informational expediant. In addition, a pair of
parallel lines represent files, semantically indicating time-delayed data
exchange as opposed to the instantaneous nature of data flow across
named vectors. The DFD source and sink constructs are unused in this
work.
The second notable convention pertains to the encryption of messages
and fields thereof passing between authentication model communicants
in the DFDs. In this instance, a pair of curly braces
'{}'
delimits the
encrypted message. The cleartext is identified between these braces,
with the encryption key denoted as a superscript following the trailing
brace. For instance, {mydata}<A represents the ciphertext formed by
encrypting
"mydata"
under key KA. Those message fields not delimited
by curly braces are transmitted in the clear.
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2 PreviousWork
As its name conveys, the intent of this section is solely to establish the
target set of existing affairs to be extended by the original work
comprising this thesis. Of course, this end can only be achieved through a
discussion of the specific topic of the student's research: the current
Xerox Network Systems Authentication-by-Proxy model. Equally as
relevant to a distributed systems research effort such as this is an
appreciation of the larger architecture in which this particular
authentication service plays an integral role, XNS. It is imperative that the
reviewer understand both the broad organization of the encompassing
architecture and the specific role of the particular service under
investigation in order to accurately verify the need for and sufficiency of
proposed architectural modifications produced by the student.
The committee's verification of these attributes of the student's work is
the means of thesis evaluation. The other qualification necessary to
perform this function is an appreciation of established protection
principles. This section therefore sets these forth as well. In fact, this
discussion largely mirrors the evolution in security developments both in
a historical sense and by the student. That is, the fundamental set of
protection basics established in the course of computer security
mechanisms for standalone systems is extended to networked
configurations, finally concentrating on authentication. These topics are
treated in considerable detail in the student's prior research reports.2-3,4
Only the most relevant of these established practices are described
below.
2.1 Protection Primitives
Security systems in the non-computing sense are quite mature as a
consequence of considerable historical research. For the same reason,
protection mechanisms in standalone computing systems are quite
well-
understood at this point in time. While this knowledge is far from
complete, those pursuing the problem now possess considerable capacity
to deliver effective computer protection facilities. Of course, total system
security in any computing environment is a multi-faceted problem
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According to its proponents, each of these factors may be thought of as
varying by weight from zero to one according to the application
environment. If any single component is deficient, total system security is
at risk of some magnitude in spite of effective complementary measures.
Likewise, redundant investments across these factors provide no
additional overall assurance while inflating costs. The trick as a security
systems architect is to strike an effective balance among these various
control points given the potential leverage of each.
While all of these factors are interesting, the last two are those most
pertinent to this research. The primary reason for introducing this
broader view systems view at this point is to emphasize the urgent need
to comprehend and actively manage the system impact consequent to
decisions at the individual protection mechanism level. This point
underscored, the discussion now resumes its computer security theme. In
particular, the remainder of this section highlights the basic elements of
computing protection.
2.1.1 Reference Monitor
Among the fundamental properties of computing systems is the sharing
of a common set of resources among many clients as illustrated in Figure
2.1.1.1. Depending upon the specifics of the situation, sharing provides
significant opportunity with respect to such system quality factors as
efficiency, reliability, and usability.22
However, architectural accomodations must be made in order to reap the
potential benefits of resource sharing. The most studied of these deal
with the synchronization of client references to the shared resources. The
semaphore provides a primitive, though complete and widely-utilized,
means of synchronization. A glaring shortfall of the semaphore is the
fact that its effectiveness is heavily reliant upon the correctness of its
explicit use by each of the resource clients. By centralizing the
synchronization logic, the monitor provides a more attractive means of
resource reference timing arbitration from such quality perspectives as
reliability, verifiability, and maintainability.
22-23
Protection is a second architectural accomodation which is consequent to
the goal of orderly resource sharing. Rather than coordinating
shared-
resource references along the dimension of time, protection mechanisms
do so according to the predefined rights of the client with respect to the
resource. In this way, resource access is constrained to be consistent with
the intent of its owner and the best interest of its client community.
Taking a page from the evolution of synchronization primitives described
above, the reference monitor model of Figure 2.1.1.2 is the conceptual
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protection enforcement primitive.!2 This model classifies those shared
resources to be protected as objects, with their clients referred to as
subjects. Note that not all shared resources need be protected. Typical
subjects include human users and the processes which serve them. Files,
documents, records, devices, memory segments, and instructions are
generally categorized by the system architect as objects to be protected.
This organization establishes the granularity of protection provided by
the system.
Each subsequent attempt by a subject to access an object must be
mediated by the reference monitor based upon the predefined relations
to which it alone has access. The reference monitor itself also need be
isolated from influence by the subjects as an additional means of
assuring the reliability of its operation. This assurance is also bolstered by
explicitly engineering those quality criteria supporting verifiability into
the reference monitor.6,22
These requirements are manifested in the security kernel element of the
system depicted in Figure 2.1.1.3. This diagram represents system
architecture as a hierarchy of virtual machines, consistent with the
contemporary trend.
24 Note that the security kernel provides the
base-
level virtual machine by managing all protected shared-resources,
thereby satisfying the required reference monitor property of mediation.
It likewise maintains a separate execution domain for itself per the
requirement of isolation. Finally, such centralization and size
minimization facilitate verification of its correct operation. To complete
the architecture, the supervisor exports remaining operating system
services to the applications layer, which in turn serves the end-usersJ2
2.1.2 Threats
A prerequisite to the design of effective protection schemes is an
understanding of the threats to be countered. This process of matching
requirements to design is no different than that of any other aspect of
system engineering. A quality solution is particularly critical in the
instance of protection features, however, as end-user utility is directly
proportional to the number of design oversights. Even a single flaw in
the solution, if sufficiently significant, could render the remaining
protection considerations useless. At the very least, user confidence is
severely eroded by identification of protection shortfalls.
One might consider the above claim of the need for absolute protection
integrity to be an unreasonable quality demand. Therein lies the
relevance of the flaw's significance. By design, protection schemes are
rarely absolute. To do so would be counterproductive to the associated
goal of controlled, efficient, resource sharing. An inverse relation of sorts
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exists between the ease of resource sharing and protection scheme
severity. The middle ground most often chosen is to adopt sufficient
protection as to reduce the reward associated with successful intrusion to
a level as to be unwarranted by the cost to do so.21 Once again,
attainment of this goal implies a comprehensive understanding of
potential threats.
Such threats may be evaluated according to various orientations. That
which is most widely acclaimed in the media is the motivation behind the
compromise. In fact, many equate protection solely with the goal of
preventing deliberate intrusion. This perspective represents a dangerous
simplification - one which has led many an organization to ignore those
prudent precautions which could prevent the inevitable accidental
threats on the flip side of the motivational coin. It is sometimes easy to
effectively argue that the cost of protection is superflous on the basis of
the inherent goodness of those comprising the work group. In a
distributed system environment, such an argument is much less
convincing given the potential disparity of users and participating nodes.
In any case, the added complexity introduced by distribution begs for
effective protection if only on the basis of the risk associated with
inadvertent sources of failure.
A second orientation by which threats may be interpreted is as passive or
active. Whereas the value in considering threat motivation lies in
assessing the probability of compromise occurrence, this view considers
the post-intrusion state of the system. This information, in turn,
constrains the attributes of the set of mechanisms by which the threat
may effectively be countered. A passive threat is defined to be one in
which unauthorized disclosure of information occurs without impacting
system state in a noticeable way. On the other hand, an active threat is
one in which damage is inflicted through a change in system state. This
distinction is significant in that passive threats must be prevented as, by
definition, they cannot be detected after the fact. In contrast, active
threats often cannot be prevented but can absolutely be detected. As a
system response, this implies the minimal need to detect such attacks,
ideally complemented with correction mechanisms.
The net impact of a compromise upon the target object is the most
tangible of all possible interpretations. Given such relevance, these have
been set forth below in distinct subsections.
2.1.2.1 Unauthorized Disclosure
In this type of threat, information is made known to one for whom it is
not intended. This is referred to as interception when unauthorized
disclosure occurs as a consequence of a deliberate act, and as exposure
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otherwise. 14 Unauthorized disclosure is generally a consequence of
passive threats. Prevention is thus the protection strategy often
associated with specific forms of it. Examples of this class of threat to
which the reader may relate include reading from memory regions to
which one is not privy and wire-tapping.
2.1.2.2 Unauthorized Modification
In this type of threat, information is modified by one not authorized to
do so. This is referred to as deception when unauthorized modification
occurs as a consequence of a deliberate act, and as alteration
otherwise. 14 Unauthorized modification is generally a consequence of
active threats. Detection is thus the protection strategy often associated
with specific forms of it. Examples of this class of threat to which the
reader may relate include writing to memory regions to which one is not
intended access and modification of messages on data communications
lines.
2.1.2.3 Denial of Service
In this type of threat, access to an object for which one is sufficiently
authorized is wrongly prevented by another. This is referred to as
disruption when denial of service occurs as a consequence of a deliberate
act, and as interruption otherwise. 14 Denial of service is equally likely to
be a consequence of threats which are passive or active in nature. This is
often a particularly difficult type of threat to handle.When prevention is
not an alternative protection strategy, detection is employed. Even
detection is sometimes ineffective. Examples of this class of threat to
which the reader may relate include allocation of all available memory
and infinite execution loops.
2.1.3 Access Control Paradigms
Having partitioned the system elements into subject and object sets, the
system architect must define the protection policy to be enforced by the
reference monitor. Thanks in large part the existence of the broadly-
accepted Bell and LaPadula formal security model, this is one wheel
which need not be constantly reinvented but simply balanced against
application-specific needs. This model is the product of Department of
Defense-sponsored research conducted in the mid-1970's at Mitre
Corporation and CaseWestern Reserve University.
Two types of access control policy are identified by the Bell and LaPadula
model: mandatory and discretionary. As the name implies, mandatory
policies are uniformly enforced by the reference monitor according to
the so-called dominance relation which exists given the predefined
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classifications associated with the particular subject and object involved
in any transaction. Discretionary, or need-to-know policies, enable
subjects to create new objects and to determine the scope to which other
subjects will be allowed access. A particular reference monitor may
enforce a combination of these policies depending upon the level of
assurance reguired to support the system's intended application.
As introduced above, monitor enforcement of a mandatory policy is
based upon the clearance of the subject, the sensitivity of the object, and
the type of access. Considerable mandatory policy tailoring to
application needs may be performed given the alternatives of
hierarchical and nonhierarchical classification schemes.4 A pair of key
principles determine the acceptability of a type of access by subject to
object independent of categorization scheme: the simple security
condition and the *-property (pronounced "star-property").
The simple security condition states that only those subjects possessing
clearance greater than or egual to the sensitivity of the object may
acguire (i.e. read) its contents. A somewhat more subtle aspect of the
unauthorized disclosure threat is addressed by enforcement of the
*-
property. Under this rule, object modification (i.e. write) is granted to
only those subjects whose clearance is less than or egual to that of the
object's sensitivity.
Application of the *-property prevents many of those potential "Trojan
Horse"
attacks in which unauthorized object declassification is
perpetrated as a side effect of valid data acguisition by a subject. A
simple such threat scenario could occur in conjunction with the
introduction of a utility to be shared throughout a user population of
varying clearance. While apparently performing to the complete
satisfaction of its clients, such a utility could also seek to record a copy of
all information to which it is exposed in a minimum sensitivity repository
which may subseguently be legitimately accessed indiscriminately under
the conditions of the simple security condition. This intrusion is
prevented through enforcement of the *-property, for while the utility
remains rightly allowed to acguire objects consistent with the clearance
of its present user, under no circumstance may it store information in a
less-sensitive object than that of the user's clearance. 51 The integrity of
the simple security condition is thereby reinforced by the *-property.
A second type of access control policy is referred to as discretionary. This
term is representative of the fact that such policies regulate object access
based not upon their static sensitivity level, but at the discretion of an
owning subject. The extent of object availability is determined only by
the owner's assessment as to the set of subjects which possess a need-to-
10
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know with respect to that object. The granularity of such discrimination
varies from coarse in the case of a group structure scheme to fine in the
more robust access or capability list representations touched upon
below.4 The success of object protection under a discretionary policy is
thus directly proportional to the accuracy of the owner's decision, the
diligence with which this responsibility is exercised, and the granularity
of the mechanism. A discretionary policy is thus particularly well-suited
to those situations in which a number of subjects of indistinguishable
clearance cooperate to complete an operation.
2.1.4 Access Right Representation Schemes
Important consequences derive from the access right representation
mechanism selected under a discretionary access control policy. Basically,
the choice is between association of the rights with the object or the
subject. The more common former instance is referred to as an access list,
while the latter is termed a capability list.
25
Conceptually, each entry of an access list describes the rights of a subject
with respect to the associated object. Reference mediation given an
access list representation consists of searching the object's access list for
the rights of the referencing subject. Unfortunately, this can be
somewhat time-consuming and provides no simple means of identifying
the complete rights of a particular subject across all objects. 23
Capability lists have just the opposite profile it is easy to determine the
scope of a subject's rights across all objects, but very costly to trace the
rights of all subjects against a given object. Consequently, rights
revocation is quite costly. In this case, each entry in the list names an
object and describes the subject's particular access rights in its regard.
Each such construct is referred to as a capability. When the subject wishes
to exercise its rights under such a scheme, it presents its capability for the
target object to the reference monitor. The reference monitor equates
capability possession with the subject's right to complete the reference.
This being the case, capability creation must be a protected operation.
This is often implemented by selecting capabilities based on large, sparse,
random object name spaces which probabilistically precludes their
forgery.23,26,27
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22 Protection within Networked Systems
Until quite recently, the emphasis of protection mechanism research and
development focused on non-networked system architectures. Most of
the spadework pertaining to security between communicating systems
had been focused on the fundamental mechanisms of encryption and
identification due to their utility in timesharing applications. This was
sufficient given the fact that networking technologists were
simultaneously working to demonstrate the achievability of their open
system ideal. In light of marked commercial system disparity, their task
has been to develop models enabling arbitrary communications amongst
a heterogeneous collection of hosts, each of which is an element of some
independently managed, interconnected network. 8 Restriction of
exchanges which necessarily should be prevented was not an issue as
long as the technology was of the nature that such internetworking was
not possible.
Each discipline has now matured to the point that serious consideration
of the requirement to engineer secure open systems is underway. The
following factors are among the primary motivations for such
endeavors:8
The growing quantity and value of information made vulnerable
by the breaching of network security make networks tempting
targets.
Computer systems connected by networks are likely to cooperate
in various ways to provide resource sharing for a user community.
As a result of this sharing, the security of information on a given
host may become dependent on the security measures employed
by the network and by other hosts.
The development of new network technologies facilitates certain
kinds of attacks on communications systems; for example, it is
easy for an intruder to monitor the transmission of satellite and
radio networks.
The increased use of networks to provide remote access to
computer facilities, coupled with improved physical security
measures at computer sites, makes attacking networks more
attractive to an intruder.
The remainder of this section summarizes those extensions to the
primitives already discussed which contribute to such desired protection
within network systems. This discussion is constrained to encompass only
those architectural dimensions which bear directly upon the student's
specific thesis development.
12
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2.2.1 Open Systems Architecture
No survey of contemporary network architecture would be sufficient if it
omitted the International Organization for Standardization's Open
Systems Interconnection Reference Model depicted in Figure 2.2.1.1.20
The OSI protocol reference model layers network architecture in such a
way as to be maximally consistent with highly-accepted existing systems
architecture yet extensible to accomodate projected application and
technological developments. Pursuit of these goals supports the model's
mission: to provide a platform upon which commercial systems vendors
will deliver interoperable products. Both computing vendors and
customers are the end beneficiaries of such developments along such
system quality dimensions as functionality, performance, cost, and
longevity.
Among the key messages the reader should glean from Figure 2.2.1.1 is
the logical nature of exchanges between communicating nodes at any
single layer in the network hierarchy. Processes executing within the
respective nodes, physically separated by the network communications
mechanism, are referred to as peers. Another pertinent note is that peer
communications are constrained to processes in equivalent layers of the
model. This is contrasted by physical exchanges across the interface
between adjacent architectural layers within a single node. Peer
exchanges represent semantics, while interface exchanges support
communications.
The diagram also illustrates a key distinction related to the nature of
exchanges between processes in layers one through three, collectively
known as the communications subnet, and those of the higher-order
four layers. Subnet interactions occur among a variable number of
adjacent IMPs, or message switches, along the route from source to
destination node. These exchanges add nothing to the semantic
handling of the exchange, but merely facilitate moving the message
along the path to its final destination. In the Transport through
Applications layers, traffic is end-to-end in the sense that only the
intended processeswithin the source and destination nodes participate.
The layered systems decomposition employed in the OSI model is based
upon the Principle of Steps, a hierarchical ordering principle exhibited by
complex systems throughout the universe including operating systems
and networks.24 Three observations comprise this notion :
The universe is mostly empty space.
At each step there are well-defined objects with well-defined
rules of interaction.
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The objects of a given step are composed of objects of lower steps
and are constituents of objects of higher steps.
Such partitioning facilitates an orderly migration of the system over time
based upon the localized evolution of its component layers. The
following particular design rules guided the ISO in its development of
the seven layers comprising its model. 20
A layer should be created where a different level of abstraction is
needed.
Each layer should perform a well defined function.
The function of each layer should be chosen with an eye toward
defining internationally standardized protocols.
The layer boundaries should be chosen to minimize the
information flow across the interfaces.
The number of layers should be large enough that distinct
functions need not be thrown together in the same layer out of
necessity, and be small enough that the architecture does not
become unwieldy.
The consequent functional decomposition of network architecture under
the OSI model is presented in Figure 2.2.1.2.15 Due to the lack of urgency
at the time of its development noted previously, no provisions for
protection are specified in the base model.
2.2.2 Threats
Five additional threats accrue from the nature of communications
between networked systems. Whereas all represent flavors of the
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized modification, and denial of
service threats presented earlier, each is endowed special character given
such an architectural expansion. As before, understanding such threats is
a prerequisite to successfully countering their occurrence as required.
2.2.2.1 Release ofMessage Contents
Distributed systems are particularly susceptible to this passive threat of
unauthorized disclosure. This is largely a conseguence of the fact that the
set of messages comprising each transaction between cooperating
principals must pass through the intervening network machinery on each
end-node in addition to the communications subnet. Depending upon
such factors as the effectiveness of the computer security at each switch,
the physical security of the transmission media, and the nature of the
subnet, messages face the very distinct possibility of interception by an
unauthorized party.
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2.2.2.2 Traffic Analysis
A very subtle source of unauthorized disclosure is that which may occur
as a conseguence of monitoring the demographics of traffic patterns on
the underlying communications subnet. That is, an intruder may glean a
significant volume of information as a side-effect of the freguency,
length, and source-to-destination traffic attributes.
Traffic analysis is a serious threat as a potential covert timing channel.
13
Communicants A and B may deliberately choose to interact in defined
patterns as a means of clueing party C into sensitive information. As in
the standalone machine case, such disclosures are best fought by channel
bandwidth reduction belowthe threshold of desireability.21,28
2.2.2.3 Message Stream Modification
Threats of this sort refer to attacks on the integrity, authenticity, and/or
the ordering of messages passing between principals.13 Integrity means
that a message has not been modified en route. Authenticity, our
eventual subject focal point, means that the issuer of the the message is
that whom the receiver expects it to be. And ordering means that the
message can be properly located in the message seguence passing
between the communicants. Attacks to authenticity include insertion of
bogus or replayed messages while those to ordering include message
deletion or duplication and altering the order of messages within the
stream.
These three properties share a unigue relationship in that measures to
address integrity are fundamental to insuring authenticity, which is
likewise basic to message order preservation.13
2.2.2.4 Denial ofMessage Service
This type of attack may be perceived as a persistent message stream
modification attack. Such attacks include discarding or delaying all
messages passing in either or both directions of an association between
two communicants.8 As is true of its standalone machine eguivalent, this
threat variant is sometimes guite difficult to detect. This is particularly
true during those intervals when an exchange is guiescent. At that point
in time, each party to the conversation generally has no way of
predicting when the next message
will arrive from its associate. An attack
which completely reduces message arrivals from the other party cannot
be detected: "is my partner really
idle??"
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2.2.2.5 Spurious Association Initiation
While sharing the characteristic of being the conseguence of an active
attack with the previous two forms discussed, spurious association
initiation differs from its counterparts in its timing relative to the
communications lifecycle itself. That is, this type of attack occurs while
the two parties are in the process of establishing a connection, whereas
the others take place after successful completion of this phase of the
interchange. The two forms of spurious association initiation most
freguently encountered are:8
impersonation: an attempt to establish an association under a
false identity.
replay: repeating a recording of a previous legitimate association
initiation seguence or portion thereof.
The interactive form of authentication of which the subject XNS model is
an instance exists specifically to prevent successful spurious association
initiations. This point is likely self-evident to the reader. In light thereof,
what is the significance in understanding the four remaining classes of
threat described above? Quite simply, while authentication is a means to
combat spurious message initiation, the messages by which it provides
that protection are themselves subject to the same threats as are any
interchanges among distributed system components. Other than that of
traffic analysis, an effective means of countering each of the threats
described above is a prereguisite to dependable authentication models.
This represents a second observation of the fragile interdependence of
protection components upon net effectiveness.
2.2.3 Protection Mechanisms
In response to increasing recognition of the risk which these threats pose
to the reliable operation of networked systems, many mechanisms by
which they may be countered have been identified.
5 All are guite
intricate. Each is effective when applied in the proper situation,
otherwise not. Some facilitate passive threat prevention, while others
enable active threat detection and/or correction. Many are certainly
directly relevant to the critigue of the existing XNS
Authentication-by-
Proxy mechanism to be presented later in this report. These are discussed
in the remainder of this section, as are a number of others of high utility
to the student in the pending architectural revision component of this
thesis.
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2.2.3.1 Encryption
Fittingly, our discussion of protection mechanisms beginswith that which
is clearly both the most widely-recognized and versatile. As a
conseguence of judicious message encryption, passive intrusions may
largely be prevented and active attacks detected. Such potency has led to
widespread development and adoption of encryption algorithms.
Conseguent to such heavy application, this mechanism is also the
freguent target of vulnerability identification research, colloquially
known as hacking orcracking.
For the purpose of this discussion, encryption is interesting only as to the
manner in which it is applied as a means of message isolation between
distributed communicants. Though technically-challenging, algorithm
mechanics are beyond the scope of this need. It is within those
constraints that our discussion proceeds.
2.2.3.1.1 Invertible vs. One-Way Translations
Encryption refers to the process of translating cleartext into ciphertext
for the interval of time during which it is subject to attack and back to
cleartext when it is again in a secure domain. The conversion from
cleartext to ciphertext is referred to as encryption, while the reverse
process is termed decryption.
This is inherently an invertible process. That is, an explicit encryption goal
is to reliably recover the original text at the destination with no
information loss. The translation to ciphertext form is a temporal
response to the requirement to pass securely through notably untrusted
territory.
The definition of passing securely may represent any of a number of
goals. Among them is that of maintaining exclusive information privacy
between a set of interacting principals. This goal is diametrically opposed
to the threat of the release of message contents. Other potential goals
are to enable the message recipient to validate that it originated at the
expected intiator, as well as that the message was not altered en route.
Each of these objectives potentially motivate the need to encypt [read.
isolate] for a finite time-interval.
Invertible functions are dependent upon the intiator and recipient
uniquely possessing private information which enables the translations.
This information is generally referred to as an encryption key. Section
2.2.3.1.2 describes alternative key models. In any event, some degree of
key secrecy is mandatory to insure the privacy and/or integrity of the
ciphertext.
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A closely-related text translation concept as related to protection is that
of the one-way function. This scheme has traditionally been applied to
the authentication component of non-networked systems. 27 As the
name conveys, its major distinction from invertible functions is that the
original value may not be recovered after application of the one-way
function. The goal in this instance is not to temporarily isolate
information from potential intruders, but rather to provide a scheme
under which possession of the original cleartext is itself sufficient proof
of identity.
Figure 2.2.3.1.1 demonstrates such a technique, in which the cleartext X
is presented to the one-way function arbitrator to yield a translated
value. This is then compared with the entry of a previously-established
public lookup table which maps A's user identity to the expected such
value. The success of such a scheme is dependent upon the absolute
inability to invert this function. An additional notable assumption is that
the value produced by the function differs for each original value, as an
increased collision rate would proportionally reduce the level of identity
assurance. Function space sparseness similarly enhances protection, thus
the oft-cited interest in reasonably-lengthly cleartext. The sparseness
rate required to provide a fixed level of assurance is a function of the
translation bandwidth, which has been steadily increasing given
technological advances. The final necessary attribute of such a scheme is
randomness of the cleartext space. Each of these attributes varies the
risk/reward profile associated with brute force attacks.
Invertibility and collision-rate are implicit properties of the one-way
function, while sparseness and randomness are cleartext dependent. This
is one of the critical observations which enabled Robert Morris, Jr. to
successfully compromise the UNIX-based internetwork on November 2,
1988.17,29 in practice, the password space of typical UNIX installations is
quite clustered and predictable. This is largely a consequence of weak,
informal password management practices. Unfortunately, the scope of
the worm's compromise testifies to the fact that this is the prevailing
industry practice rather than an isolated instance. Serious enforcement
of publically-available guidelinesisthe highly-endorsed prescription.30
2.2.3.1.2 Private vs. Public Keys
As described above, encryption algorithms are dependent upon either of
two key use models. In the private key case depicted in Figure 2.2.3.1.2.1,
Kab represents a shared key which is secretly held by the transaction's
two principals, message initiator A and recipient B. The encryption
algorithm in the private key case is symmetric with respect to its use of
the common key, Kab- That is, the same key is employed both to translate
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from cleartext to ciphertext [represented in the diagram as
{CLEARTEXT}KAB] at the initiator as in the opposite direction at the
recipient.
In this instance, authentication becomes a matter of insuring that only
the two principals to a transaction are informed as to the private key
devoted to encrypt its component messages. A considerable portion of
the authentication solution thus becomes that of communicating the
private key to the principals. 9 This need is frequently aided
architecturally by introduction of a trusted authentication server [aka
key distribution center], models ofwhich are described in section 2.3.
The public key label of the alternative scheme is actually somewhat of a
misnomer. In fact, the scheme represented in Figure 2.2.3.1.2.2 depends
upon a pair of keys, one of which is publically-advertised, the other of
which is secret. The encryption algorithm in this instance is asymmetric
with respect to the key pair in that one key is required to encrypt a
message while another is required for its inversion. The public key, PKA,
is globally distributed to enable A's communicants to facilitate message
forwarding such that they are intelligible only to A by virtue of its
possession of the associated secret key, SKA. Similarly, those to whom A
issues messages may be assured of its source by the fact that they decrypt
properly under PKB. In this instance, message privacy is not the aim, but
rather source integrity is guaranteed. Accordingly, a required property of
the public key model is that neither key may be derived from the other.
This is particularly significant as regards the ability to ascertain the secret
key from its public counterpart.
Figure 2.2.3.1.2.2 actually representsa combination of the two public key
techniques described above. As recipient B is interested both in source
integrity and message privacy, initiator A first applies its secret key to the
clear text followed by B's public key. Upon destination arrival, B's secret
key is applied to strip off the privacy layer, followed by the source
integrity protection provided through decryption under PKA.
As in the private key model, a trusted authentication server is often
enlisted to support distributed systems authentication. The model of use
varies somewhat, however.
2.2.3.1.3 Link vs. End-to-End Measures
Yet another variant on the encryption puzzle pertains to its scope within
the distributed system. Under the link encryption scheme of Figure
2.2.3.1.3.1, a separate key is employed to pass the original message, M,
along each hop of its path from initiator A to recipient B. Such a scheme
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is advantageous with respect to its ability to limit traffic analysis and the
scope of exposure upon key compromise.
An alternative method is to employ an end-to-end scheme, such as that
of Figure 2.2.3.1.3.2, by which the message is encrypted once at the
initiator with the reciprocal decryption occurring only upon its arrival at
the other principal. Such a solution is generally favored by network
security architects on the basis that it enables the selective participation
of distributed system elements in the encryption scheme according to
their individual protection needs.8
This perspective is consistent with that which has been adopted by many
distributed system authentication model architects. Most such solutions
have been constrained by the assumption that the principals have freely
elected to employ authenticated communications. The broader problems
introduced by such requirements as forced secure communications or
coupling prevention are beyond the scope of thisthesis.9
2.2.3.2 Digital Signature
Analogous to its interpersonal namesake, this mechanism provides a
means of proving that a particular data object originated from the party
who's unigue marking is affixed thereon. The ability to apply the mark
must therefore be solely possessed by the object's originator. Signatures
would otherwise be unenforceable as their creators could repudiate
having issued them in the first place and possessors would have no
reliable means of demonstrating that they were not forgeries.
The secret key of asymmetric encryption schemes satisfies the marking
restriction attribute guite well. A digital signature having the stated
properties therefore consists of data or a checksum thereof encrypted
under the initiator's secret key. Authenticity may subseguently be
demonstrated by successful decryption of the signature under the
initiator's public key.
2.2.3.3 Notarization
Imposition of a third-party between transaction participants provides an
independent means of proving additional attributes about their
dealings. Such a notary is particularly effective in preventing the
subsequent repudiation of participation in the transaction by either
party. Required properties of the notary include trustworthiness,
auditability,and responsiveness.
2.2.3.4 Data Integrity
The critical nature of this mechanism's use and effectiveness is self-
evident. Data integrity is a fundamental contributor to reliable system
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operation. In the context of protection, integrity lies at the base of the
message stream modification threats hierarchy described previously. This
attribute therefore makes it a very attractive intrusion target.
Two distinct mechanisms are generally provided in support of data
integrity: one to address threats to single messages or individual fields
thereof, and a second to protect a series of related messages comprising
a peer connection. 5
The mechanism used to protect the integrity of a single message
or its component fields is distributed among the sending and
receiving peer processes. The sender tags each unit to be
protected with a value which is a function of the unit itself. The
receiver then compares the value received with that which it
would expect to be associated with the unit to assess whether a
modification has occurred to the message in transit.
Various forms of time-stamping are employed in combination
with the single message mechanism above to counter integrity
threats to a series of related messages such as misordering, loss,
replay, or data modification.
2.2.3.5 Access Control
An underlying network architecture has no bearing on this mechanism's
role as the mediator of subject to object references. However, the
reference monitor which conceptually performs this function must be
extended to comprehend the distribution of subjects and objects across
many nodes of potentially varying protection capability. Consequently,
the reference monitor and its database are themselves partitioned to
some degree across nodes comprising the distributed system as shown in
Figure 2.2.3.5. Together, the cooperating reference monitor elements
guarantee that transactions continue to conform to the overall system
security model.
Such an organization presents many interesting architectural
challenges.6,31,32,33 Among those most relevant to this discussion is the
need of the individual reference monitor elements to assume defensive
attitudes given each's respective lack of control over its peer's activity.
This is particularly crucial at the object end given the greater yield
associated with compromises therein to the intruder. The object-side
reference monitor must enforce access rights as there can be no
guarantee that incoming references have been prescreened on the
untrusted subject-side by definition.
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2.2.3.6 Authentication
Identity is a primary consideration in access right mediation decisions.
Thus, no attribute of an incoming object reference request should be
more scrutinized. It is through application of this mechanism that a
transaction recipient may gain that assurance. The initiator's suspicions
with respect to the identity of its real-time receiving peer are also laid to
rest as a consequence of exercising an effective
authentication
mechanism. Though less emphasized in this discussion, this subject-side
assurance is also necessary to achieve effective protection.
The next section provides further insight into those proposed means of
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23 Authentication Survey
One category of generic protection research remains to be discussed
prior to focusing directly on XNS and its Authentication-by-Proxy model.
Lest the reader become inattentive from anticipation, however, it should
be noted that nothing discussed thus far is more pertinent to this work.
Of course, that of such importance which is lacking is a brief survey of
those models by which authentication of the XNS flavor has been
implemented. This section thus provides such a historical view as a means
of heightening reader awareness of pertinent challenges, traditional
responses, and the genesis of many of the techniques which were
blended to form the XNS authentication mechanism. 2
2.3.1 Architecture
The first notable architectural property of the models to be surveyed is a
common reliance upon private key encryption as the means of achieving
both message privacy and source integrity. This is consistent with the XNS
mechanism. As it so happens, models of comparable complexity have also
been developed employing public keys. Tradeoffs between the two key
mechanisms lie in the strength and performance efficiencies of the
specific underlying encryption algorithms, as well as the security
provisions offered by the underlying machines.9
All are limited to address the protection threats of impersonation or
replay at connection establishment in a system of loosely-coupled
processes. Protocol robustness against other threat forms is indicative of
those solutions likely to be effective in achieving protected networking
generally.
An additional shared property is primarily the consequence of the
requirement to support network extensibility to global proportions. The
sheer magnitude and likely dynamics of the potential process set within
such a domain eliminates consideration of the brute-force solution of
maintaining a separate private key pair to service exchanges between
each combination of principals.
Consequently, an authentication service is introduced to provide the
essential functions of generating and securely distributing private,
lifetime-limited, conversation keys. Therein lies the motivation for the
service's alternate name: key distribution center. In order to securely pass
messages between the authentication service and any principal, it must
possess a copy of each's private key.
Given this role, it is evident that the principals depend heavily upon the
authentication service's integrity. Its failure to perform reliably is
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unavailability, in which case underlying transactions cannot proceed
securely. Thus, a potential denial of service attack could be targeted at
taking the authentication service out of commission. A more crucial
failure would be experienced were the authentication service's key
database compromised.
Key privacy is fundamental to any encryption-based protection scheme.
Immunity from compromise is largely dependent upon effective local
security at each element participating in the authentication model, not
merely the service. Additionally, the key space is expected to be large,
sparse, and random as a precaution against brute-force attacks. The
algorithm itself must be immune from cryptanalysis.
Finally, the authentication service is typically closely aligned with a
distributed naming authority. This is an outcome of their similar role in
translating name to property, which is specifically the associated
encryption key as pertains the authentication service.
2.3.2 Models
The authentication service's private channel to each principal enables the
significant achievement of guaranteeing a message's recipient of its
original source. This obviously goes a long way towards convincing
mutually suspicious principals of each other's claimed identity. While
necessary, it is not sufficient to solve the authentication problem. The
models below best illustrate why this is so.
2.3.2.1 Simple
The intuitive authentication solution is that represented in Figure 2.3.2.1.
In this initial model, transaction initiator A forwards its identity and
private key, Ka, to recipient B in cleartext. The crucial underlying premise
is that knowledge of Ka is sufficient proof of the initiator's identity. B
confirms the accuracy of this mapping through consultation with the
authentication service. A's secret key accompanies future replies from B
in order to satisfy A's suspicions relative to B. B's knowledge of Ka is
equated with having received it knowingly from A.
This model is simple in the sense that all protection threats are assumed
irrelevant. While not generally an appropriate assumption, certainly
there exist limited applications within which it is. One likely example is
that of a closed network of entry-level devices. Under such circumstances,
it hardly seems cost-effective to incur the additional expense associated
with defense against deliberate attack. Accidental threats remain a




Figure 2.3.2.2: Base Strong Model9
Enhancements to the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy Model
2.3.2.2 Base Strong
Much of the groundwork in the area of authentication modeling is
credited to Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder. Fittingly, their
contributions comprise a significant percentage of that considered here.
Figure 2.3.2.2 was their perspective of the fundamental private-key
based authentication model as of 1978. Many attributes of this model are
evident in subsequent efforts through deliberate emulation.
Alternatively, the perceived shortcomings of their model often serve as a
primary basis of proposed alternatives.
This model begins with the initiator forwarding the name of the
intended recipient and itself with a nonce, lA, to the authentication
service in cleartext. The nonce is simply a non-repeating number which its
sender, who in this instance is A, uses to insure the timeliness of replies in
which it is contained. Thus, it serves as a defense against message replay
attacks.
The authentication service constructs and forwards a private reply to A's
opening message. A's nonce is included in the message as proof of
message currency. Inclusion of the recipient's name guarantees A that it
was not modified en route to the authentication service as a mean of
inducing A to unknowingly interact with an intruder The private
conversation key, CK, unique to this transaction is also returned securely
to A in this message. Finally, the authentication service includes an
authenticator, {CK, A}kb# which is of no direct use to A as it is encrypted
under B's private key. Rather, this is forwarded to B, who alone can
acquire the enclosed conversation key and initiator's name.
Having done so, B is convinced that the authentication service alone
could have generated the authenticator signaling A as the transaction's
initiator as it alone has access to B's private key, KB. However, no
accomodations have been made thus far to counter a replay of this
message.While B could protect itself against this threat by maintaining a
used conversation key table, such a design would be quite cost-
ineffective. Rather, B employs the recently-acquired conversation key to
issue a message containing a different nonce, Ib, to the initiator. As this
message is discernable only by A, B can assume that a reply which is both
a simple function of the nonce and is encrypted under the conversation
key could only originate at A.
Both parties may now be relatively satisfied that the other is that whom
it purports to be.
25
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2.3.2.3 Cached Authenticator
Needham and Schroeder observed that a performance shortcut may be
desireable relative to their base model. That is, when two principals
interact frequently, A may cache the authenticator {CK, A}kb. Their
resulting model is illustrated in Figure 2.3.2.3.
Steps one and two need only be executed once per principal pair. They
remain essentially the same as in the former model. This model varies
from that with the inclusion of a second nonce originating at A in steps
three and four, however. Its purpose is to prevent replay of B's nonce in
step four. Through such a replay scenario, an intruder could intercept
each of A's messages to B transparent to A. This would amount to a
denial of service at A. Presence of the function of A's nonce, Ia2 1, in
message four is sufficient to convince A that B is in receipt of message
three.
Key caching slightly increases the risk associated with conversation key
compromise. This translates directly into a slight degradation in the
identity assurance level associated with this model.
2.3.2.4 Timestamp
In the models above, the nonce has been exchanged through
handshaking to convince its originator as to the timeliness of the
connection sequence. Alternatively, Denning and Sacco propose the use
of message timestamps as demonstrated in Figure 2.3.2.4. They argue
that this scheme is both more robust and efficient than the base private
key model.
In the unlikely event that a conversation key is compromised, they point
out, the base model allows an intruder to impersonate the initiator
indefinitely by first replaying the authenticator and thereafter
intercepting and answering the recipient's challenge encrypted under
the conversation key.
This model introduces the need for local clocks at the authentication
service and the principals. It is further expected that these are
periodically synchronized from a network time service. Given these
additional facilities, this timestamp-based model requires two less
messages than the base private key model as it eliminates the nonce-
based handshake of steps four and five.
This exchange begins much as the base model, with initiator A notifying
the authentication service of its intent to connect to recipient B. The
nonce of the base model is replaced in the authentication service's reply







Figure 2.3.2.5: Nonce-Protected Conversation Key ModeP 1
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which is ultimately destined for B. Both A and B compare TAs with their
current local time. In each instance, they conclude that the message is not
a replay if:
|LocalTime - TAs| < (Ati + At2), where
LocalTime : Current time as reflected by the principal's local
clock
Ati : Expected discrepancy between the clock at the
authentication service and that of the principal
At2: Expected network delay time
The scope of this model's effectiveness is constrained by the magnitude
of (Ati+At2) as replays are undetectable within this interval. It is
suggested that reasonable value for Ati is between one and two
minutes. Authenticator caching is also prevented as a side-effect of the
planned-obsolescence characteristic of this model.
2.3.2.5 Nonce-Protected Conversation Key
The timestamp solution is not without drawbacks. In addition to the
minimal opportunity for impersonation introduced by the (Ati + At2)
window, Needham and Schroeder point out that the cost of distributed
clock maintenance cannot be overlooked.
Figure 2.3.2.5 represents their base private key model modified to
accomodate the somewhat remote risk of conversation key compromise.
The basis of the model is that the nonce should always be generated by
the principal which seeks reassurance of transaction timeliness.
Accordingly, they recognized that a mechanism had to be devised by
which B generates a nonce for subsequent protected confirmation.
They achieved this goal by having initiator A first pass a clear text
message identifying itself to recipient B. The response to this message is
encrypted under the recipient's private key, as it is ultimately intended
for use by the authentication service. The initiator's identity is included as
a defense against modification of A's opening message to B. If
undetected, such an event could result in a subsequent denial of service
by B in step five. In addition, B generates and includes nonce J in its reply.
The contents of A's initial message to the authentication service of the
base private key model is complemented with this protected response
from B. Similarly, the authentication service's reply to A's message three
remains unchanged other than by its inclusion of nonce J in the
authenticator destined for B. Upon its receipt from A, B verifies that the
enclosed nonce maps to that issued against the initiator.
This model differs notably from its counterparts in this survey. The other
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integrated and extended to form the XNS model. On the other hand, this
model followed the XNS model in the historical evolution of
authentication mechanisms. Its relevance to this discussion is as an
example of contemporary technique, exhibiting remaining shortfalls and
improvements against those which served as the basis of the XNS
solution.
2.3.2.6 Remote Procedure Callback
The model of Figure 2.3.2.6 is an interesting hybrid of those discussed
thus far in the sense that its reliance upon such standard techniques as
nonces and timestamps is complemented with unique theme variations.
The initiator/authentication service opening exchange represents a
combination of the base model and that of timestamping. A nonce, Ia, is
used to insure timeliness of the service's response to A. On the other
hand, a timestamp is embedded in the authenticator. The associated
semantics are themselves somewhat different from that of the earlier
timestamp model: to limit the exposure available through private or
conversation key compromise to a matter of a few of hours.
This model was developed by Andrew D. Birrell to serve as a key
component within a secure remote procedure call facility.43 Some of the
attributes of his model thus uniquely accomodate its role within a
security framework. In particular, ease of use at the remote procedure
call level is stressed. Towards this end, the concept of a conversation is
introduced. This is the incremental overhead incurred by the remote
procedure call user in the interest of secure interactions.
For the purposes of this discussion, this concept is important for many
reasons. Of these, the first is that by which it is identified. The (PIDa, Ta)
pair of messages three and four serve this purpose. These represent a
network-wide forever-unique concatentation of the initiator's processor
identifier and local clock value. Semantically, the conversation identifier
maps to the principal pair and conversation key within the largely-
transparent authentication scheme in each end node. This enables
transaction recognition and message decryption.
The concept of callback comes into play as follows. The initiator passes its
choice of conversation identifier in clear text to the recipient along with
the encrypted remote procedure call. At B, this is mapped into a table of
known current conversations. Not finding an entry corresponding to this
conversation, B is unable to decrypt the parameters of the protected
procedure call as the conversation key is unknown as well. Consequently,
B requests A to forward the authenticator it acquired earlier in message
two. This request is protected by a nonce, Ib, per the lessons of the base
private key model. The encrypted call identifier, Cid, provides protection
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against other forms of replay. Finally, A forwards the authenticator
along with a set of fields recognizeable by now as insuring message
timeliness.
Subsequent to this initial exchange both principals are in possession of
the conversation identifier. B may thereafter act on the call immediately
upon its receipt via message three. Another advantage of this scheme is
in its inherent recoverability in the face of temporal recipient failure. The
original request for authenticator sequence is repeatable on an
as-
needed basiswithin the window from Tas to (Tas + At).
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2-4 Xerox Network Systems
One of the prime organizational contributors to the historical evolution
of the computing industry has been Xerox Corporation. Its corporate
research and product development organizations, most notably the Palo
Alto Research Center, have introduced a long list of revolutionary
concepts in such speciality areas as personal computing hardware and
software architecture, networking, protection, programming languages,
and software engineering. Examples include the Alto personal computer,
the lightweight-process operating system organization, the mouse user
input device, the STAR desktop user interface metaphor, the Ethernet
data communications mechanism, access control and covert channel
paradigms, the Mesa programming language and development
environment, and the Interpress page description language.25,28,39,40,41
All of these innovations support the corporation's objective of being the
industry's leading supplier of integrated office system products. The glue
which pulls together the individual products offering the various
capabilities described above into a system is the Xerox Network System
architecture. At the time of its introduction, XNS was a major advance
into operational distributed operating systems from its more-common,
less-capable, networked counterparts. 34 Though not an industry leader
by placement measures, XNS continues to be a significant operational
platform in the contemporary commercial office systems environment.
The remainder of the student's final report specifically pertains to this
historically notable workstation-based distributed system. Of course, the
emphasis of these tasks is the critique and subsequent enhancement of
the Authentication-by-Proxy protection element of the XNS architecture.
This can only be performed effectively in light of the larger issues of the
system application and consequent general architecture. It is the purpose
of the remainder of this section to exhibit such insight.
2.4.1 Application: Distributed Document Management
Among the unarguable conclusions one might draw upon an inspection
of the contemporary international business environment is that its
unprecedented dynamics preclude effective long-term performance by
any but the most flexible of
organizations. Counter to the traditional
American treatment of labor as a production factor to be optimized,
minimized, or even eliminated, experts now recognize that people
represent the greatest leverage towards such flexibility. 35, 36 The
workforce must therefore be treated as the primary asset of any
organization aspiring to sustained success.
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Many conditions must be present within the organizational culture to
ensure a workforce which is sufficiently prepared to respond to the
ever-
shifting challenges of the business climate. In addition to responsibility
and accountability, knowledgeability must be imparted to its lowest
levels. Not only is this a consequence of proper educational preparation,
but also of efficient access to information regarding the daily affairs of
the office environment. Office information systems exist primarily to
support such essential communications.15
Within an electronic office system, the information to be exchanged is
typically expressed as a document. A document is a structured
organization of information designed to be communicated effectively
with people. A document may be represented on various media
including paper, video monitorsor voice. 15
Thus, efficient document management is the primary business of an
office system. Many operations comprise this application such as
creation, layout, editing, translation, retention, transfer, media
rendering, replication, and archival. A particular office system may
support different combinations of these functions depending upon its
specific mission. Production publishing is an example among the more
comprehensive of these, while electronic mail falls in the familiar low
end of the functionality scale.37,38
In addition to the ability to tailor office system functionality to
organizational information availability needs, its topology must be
configurable to accomodate the using organization's geographic
distribution. This tends to be a rather dynamic attribute of modern
organizations. As a general trend, however, the geographic breadth of
business transactions is far-reaching, often multinational. As most well-
formed organizations conform to the Principle of Steps mentioned
earlier, such distant communications are relatively infrequent in
comparison to those occurring locally. Additionally, infrequent
interorganizational exchanges need also be accomodated in open system
environments. Topology optimizations may be applied consistent with
these observations.
Such a situation forms a strong argument favoring a distributed
organization in the case of document management systems. Other
quality factors also support
such a course including the familiar list of
expandability, integrity, availability, and reliability. This is the niche
which XNS exists to satisfy. The succeeding section describes the
particular architectural characteristics of XNS which support this
applications target.
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2.4.2 Architecture
Through the 1970's timesharing and batch were the architectural
responses to the recognition that office system interactions were
clustered locally with comparatively few involving significant variance
with respect to distance. The maturity of the computer architecture and
manufacturing industry was likewise a very large factor influencing this
approach. The economics of computing and communications through
that era precluded production application of other options.
Early in that decade, however, researchers began to develop the notion
that distributed systems would one day provide a viable alternative to
batch and timesharing. Those at Xerox PARC were particularly successful
in translating their visions into operational prototypes. Their research
networks were subsequently translated into commercial products. The
innovative Xerox Network Systems architecture serves as the backbone of
the system those elements may be configured to comprise.
2.4.2.1 Data Communications
Among the key contributors to the results the PARC researchers achieved
was the decision that a local area network would provide the necessary
data communications foundation upon which to construct a distributed
document management system possessing the requisite quality factors.
Of course, Ethernet is the product of this foresight.
Xerox'
specific research definitions for this mechanism encompass the
physical and data links of the ISO/OSI model. These were proven usable
through application to a large-scale internal research network. The
Digital Equipment and Intel Corporations subsequently collaborated
with Xerox to develop the Ethernet definition which has since been
standardized as IEEE 802.3.42 A proliferation of products employing
Ethernet followed, sustaining its pace through the present time.
Figure 2.4.2.1.1 depicts the significant physical components of a standard
Ethernet local area network. The most fundamental of these is the
coaxial cable which serves as its transmission medium. This is the common
data bus for communications among any combination of network
devices, the node set within a constrained distance. The specific
maximum distance between nodes on an Ethernet is a function of such
factors as target channel efficiency, but is roughly intended to
accomodate an office complex spanning a few
kilometers.1 5,20,42 The
Ethernet standard calls for baseband signaling on the coaxial cable at a
data rate of 10Mbps.
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Message broadcasting within the local area network is the notable
consequence of this bus architecture. The transceiver provides the
associated significant physical layer functionality of channel contention
detection based upon Ethernet's innovative CSMA/CD scheme. It also
performs other expected physical layer functions such as signal encoding
and decoding. Transceivers thus provide a standard unit by which
network devices are physically connected to the coaxial cable.
The network interface implements data link functionality within the
network device. The most notable element of this responsibility is the
contention arbitration portion of the CSMA/CD scheme. Lastly, the drop
cable simply transports data link messages between the transceiver and
the network interface, enabling their physical separation as depicted.
Transparent to the network devices, individual Ethernet local area
networks may be interconnected via point-to-point channels to form a
wide area network as illustrated in Figure 2.4.2.1.2. In this way, the
relatively light demand for transactions between distant nodes may be
sufficiently accomodated in XNS. The specific WAN topology may be
managed to attain targets against such system quality attributes as
throughput, availability, and cost. That depicted in the example figure is
minimally reliable, though connections can be formed between any two
nodes if thethree point-to-point channels are all available.
2.4.2.2 Distributed Systems Differentiators
Such is the state of the data communications component of the XNS
architecture. Given this underpinning, the processor allocation and
transaction models are further differentiating attributes of distributed
system architectureswarranting discussion. XNS is fairly simplistic in both
instances by today's research standards, relying upon static processor
allocation and client/server transaction models. Such contemporary
concepts as load balancing and process migration are foreign to XNS.34
As for processor allocation, XNS nodes are statically classified as either
workstations or servers. A workstation in this sense is any network device
which is employed directly by an individual to perform document
management functions. Personal computing as it is known today is a
distant descendant of this vision from PARC researchers by which office
system workers would each have individual access to complete
customized computing systems. The name workstation is itself
representative of the model by which such personal computers would
provide most of the routine service required by the office systems
worker. This represents the next logical step beyond the timesharing
model in which each worker is presented a virtual view of personal
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computing, but is constrained by the actual limitations of the underlying
shared physical resources.
Economics dictate that some resources be routinely shared between
individuals even in a distributed system such as XNS. Servers fill this need,
offering capabilities which are most economically provided all network
users through centralized facilities. Such resource management is based
upon time-slicing in a global sense, extending across a set of users whose
needs are typically accomodated locally by their workstation.
Administrators are identified among the network user population to
manage servers. Service functionality may be exported from a processor
which simultaneously operates as a workstation.
Evident in this discussion is the fact that server access is on a demand
basis. Therein lies the prime motivation for
XNS'
adoption of a
client/service transaction model. Simply stated, a client is an entity which
issues service requests, while a service is the entity which responds.
Services are passive in that they do not independently initiate client
contact. This is consistent with the further assumption that client
availability is unguaranteed at any point in time, while services are
expected to be accessible as the norm.
The transaction model relates to that for processor allocation in the
following manner. Servers export their respective services to clients via
applications-level networking components. Workstations are similarly
comprised in part by components providing the required network client
roles. A service may also act as a client of any other service.
2.4.2.3 Functional Decomposition
Figure 2.4.2.3.1 identifies the significant such architectural components
of XNS according to their mapping into the ISO/OSI division discussed
earlier. The layering is notably similar though expectedly imprecise. As
before, an informal discussion of the functional partitioning is offered in
Figure 2.4.2.3.2.
Layer 7 of the diagram is particularly informative. In addition to
describing the prominent XNS Basic Application Services which comprise
the key elements within the document management application,
Authentication is presented as part of the Application Support
Environment. Of course, we will eventually discuss the model of its
operation in considerable detail. At this point, however, one should note
that it is part of a group which includes the distributed naming and time
functions, Clearinghouse and Time respectively. The general relevance of































































































Figure 2.4.2.3.1 : Architectural Mapping of XNS to ISO/OSI Layersi 5
Layer Name Functional Description
Document Formats Within the application layer, the standards for format
or language forthe encoding of document form or
content are labeled with italic type. In many respects,
the utility of XNS depends as much on the innovative
approach to document descriptions as it does on the
actual protocols. The document encoding techniques
referred to in Figure 2.4.2.3 particularly Interpress
-
make it possible for XNS documents to be printed or
communicated anywhere on the system. Other
encoding standards are the Character Code Standard
for representing text in many languages, and the
Raster Encoding Standard for representing
compressed and uncompressed bitmap images.
Application Protocols At the application layer (ISO Model layer 7) the
Application Support Environment provides support
resources called on by users and/or the application
protocols shown immediately above. These protocols
-
mailing, printing, filing, and gateway access
- are
implemented in hardware/software to provide the
application services.
Courier XNS implements the session and presentation layers in




Internet is shown as a set of protocols corresponding
to ISO Model layers 3 and 4. The word
'internet'
is also
used to refer to the set of all interconnected Ethernets
in different locations, a relationship implemented by
these protocols.
Data Link At the next lowest layer, Figure 2.4.2.3 shows the
CCITT X.25 Virtual Circuit Protocol in a dashed box to
indicate that this protocol is part of XNS by adoption.
It is used as part of XNS utilization of packet-switching
data networks.
Physical At the lowest layer, Ethernet provides its own unique
physical interface. It is unlike traditional data
communication physical interfaces, which are shown in
the box to the right (e.g. RS-232, RS-449, X.21). These
are shown in a broken outline because, strictly
speaking, they are part of XNS by adoption rather than
by special design.












Figure 2.4.2.4: Typical Resource Configuration within an XNS Network
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2.3. Due to their interdependence, the three services are often exported
from a common processor.
A second important point is illustrated by the placement of the
Authentication service in the lowest of three application sublayers. That
is, applications service transactions may be authenticated according to
the unique protection requirements of the particular service. For
instance, filing and mail requests are expectedly authenticated. Print
submissions are not. The choice in each case governs the service's ability
to discriminate its offerings based upon the identity of the requestor. No
accomodation for authentication is provided below layer 7.
2.4.2.4 User Perspective
All of the underlying architectural concepts disclosed thus far interact to
support the user-view of an XNS network: the resource configuration.
The customer's perspective of the system is at the level of the
workstation, server, and communications equipment complement
supporting their document management tasks. For instance, a
geographically dispersed organization whose functions involve
document creation, editing, mailing, printing, and archival would likely
configure their XNS network along the lines depicted in Figure 2.4.2.4.
The system illustrated consists of two separate clusters, each of which is
based upon a local area network of equivalent functionality. A variable
number of workstations may be connected to each LAN, consistent with
the size of the respective office system staffs. These would likely be
employed for personal document creation, editing, and short-term
retention activities. Broader organizational access to the documents
produced thereby would be facilitated by electronic mailing and
migration to a file service. The latter also contributes to document
archival, demand printing, and production publishing applications. File
server capacity is scaleable accordingly. Print servers are another
important local system element, particularly for proofing the state of
in-
process workstation documents. Low bandwidth printers supporting
such services could be complemented by higher capability print services
should production printing also be a system requirement.
Utility application services also play a significant role in such a
configuration. A Clearinghouse Server is necessary to facilitate such
naming functions as address
lookup. It also serves as the repository for
the private keys employed by the authentication mechanism. The
Authentication Server is thus hosted on the same processor to facilitate
its reliable operation. Time services can be hosted nearly anywhere given
their use of only commonly-available resources. As Authentication and
Clearinghouse are important Time Service clients, colocation is common.
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Finally, transparent to both the workstation users and application
services, Internetwork Routing Servers forward traffic between resources
on different LANs via point-to-point channels.
From an authentication perspective, one final note regarding such a
network organization bears reinforcement. All traffic within a LAN is
available to each processor thereon as a consequence of the broadcast
nature of the underlying transmission medium. Inter-LAN traffic is
processed through at least the Internet Transport Protocol components
of each node on the adjacent local areas, as well as the connecting
routers. This magnifies protection threats, particularly those of
unauthorized disclosure, replay, and traffic analysis.
2.4.3 Authentication Model
Such architectural conditions as these combine with the applications
focus of XNS to form the environment in which the specific
authentication model of interest to this thesis need perform effectively.
Recall furtherthe significant influence which one would rightly expect to
witness on the basis of such non-XNS factors as the generic protection
theory cited earlier. That is indeed the case, as reflected in part by the
number of similar authentication models presented in section 2.3.2.
In fact, the intuitive though simple authentication model of section
2.3.2.1 is a component of the XNS mechanism. This is a consequence of its
architects'
recognition of the important performance tradeoff between
ease of system use and protection threat immunity.44 Rather than
embrace one of these conflicting customer requirements at the
wholesale expense of the other, they assumed a more flexible posture.
That is, the XNS authentication mechanism was made customer-scalable
on the basis of individual application security needs. Those sites which
prefer ease of use to stringent information security are satisfied by the
minimal capabilities of the simple model. A strong model such as the
other five surveyed earlier is provided to accomodate the needs of those
installations of the converse orientation. This is yet another pertinent
example of a protection mechanism which has been tailored to customer
need.
The student's thesis is directed only at the proxy mechanism of
XNS'
strong authentication scheme, despite its availability in both forms. This
decision is based on the observation that many of the objections raised
against a proxy capability under a purportedly threat-resistant
authentication mechanism are not customer requirements in the simple
case. For instance, impersonation is not prevented in the simple
mechanism as it is not expected to be an issue by definition. However,






Figure 2.4.3.1 : Base XNS ModeP
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characteristics of the proxy facility which undermine identity assurance
genuinely represent a serious issue.
The remainder of this section thus deals exclusively with strong
authentication under XNS. The base model is introduced first, followed
by the unique properties associated with its proxy variant. This sequence
is consistent with that of their respective development and
standardization. The base model was completed in 1984, complemented
two years later by accomodations for proxies. The student participated in
the standard review process in the latter instance. This remains the
current state of the mechanism's development.
2.4.3.1 Base
The base XNS authentication model of Figure 2.4.3.1 shares many traits
with the remote procedure callback model of section 2.3.2.6, due largely
to the cross-pollination effect of their Xerox ancestry. The fields
comprising messages one and two of each are identical. A subtle
difference lies in the semantics of Tas, however. In this instance it
represents the authenticator's expiration time. Thus, the authentication
service sets the value of what was the callback scheme's At. As before,
this is a hedge against key compromise on the order of hours.
The initiator forwards a verifier, {TaPIDb}ck, with the authenticator to
the recipient in message three. The verifier serves two purposes. Ta
works along the lines of the simple timestamping model. That is, it is
compared by the recipient with the current value of its clock to attain a
reasonable (on the order of minutes) guarantee of message timeliness.
On the other hand, PIDb further limits the scope of the authenticator to
only that instance of the recipient executing on the named processor.
Implicit in this is the extended assumption that many instances of a single
recipient may concurrently be active within the distributed system.
Finally, message four serves a role much like a nonce in that it is intended
merely as a timely confirmation of the recipient's identity to the initiator
on subsequent result passing. As usual, this is achieved by employing the
private conversation key to encrypt a function on the verifier's contents.
The XNS authentication mechanism is unique among the many studied
by the student in one very interesting respect: the proxy. It is this specific
entity which this thesis
exists to enhance. To do so, one need first
understand the motivation for its existance and the specifics of its
inclusion in the architecture. Such is the purpose of this climactic final






Figure 2.4.3.2.1 .1 : Workstation-Resident Document Printing Mode|45
Enhancements to the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy Model
2.4.3.2.1 Motivation
As noted in the discussion of section 2.4.2, print services are among the
application layer elements of the XNS architecture. Such services are
exported from servers which have been customized to efficiently
generate hardcopy corresponding to the electronic document specified
by the client. In the XNS architecture, documents to be printed are
described according to the Interpress page description language, the
precursor to the currently-popular Postscript PDL.48 Print service
execution of the instructions comprising an Interpress document yields
the output images. The transactions by which such documents are
submitted for translation likewise influence operation of the print
service.45
The model of distributed printing which is most common within XNS is
quite intuitive. As stressed previously, most of an individual's document
management operations are serviced by their workstation. This notably
includes creation, manipulation, and short-term retention. Thus, printing
of work-in-progress documents typically follows the form of Figure
2.4.3.2.1.1. Per the discussion above, the workstation forwards an
Interpress-formatted copy of the document to be printed to the print
service with the associated control instructions. This is accomplished via
XNS'
remote procedure call and bulk data transfer facilities. Note in
particular that the print service immediately copies the document from
the workstation upon receipt of the print request, while it may not
actually produce the associated hardcopy until some later point in time.
This strategy is a consequence of a number of architectural assumptions,
including the lack of guarantee that the workstation will be available on
demand and that the document may change in the interval between
request submission and imaging. Consequently, sufficient memory
resources must be configured at the print server to support the necessary
balance between cost and availability.
A second distributed printing model is more appropriate in the case of
documents which are resident on file services. Among the applications in
which one would likely expect such documents to exist are demand
printing and production publishing.
In the first instance, documents have
been migrated to a file service to facilitate their long-term retention in a
static state, against which the need to efficiently replenish a limited
hardcopy supply occasionally arises. In the latter, the document creation
and manipulation tasks are beyond the capabilities of the individual
workstations, with a central source providing integration services. This
may be a similar variant







Figure 2.4.3.2.1.2: File Service-Resident Document Printing Model 1
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Figure 2.4.3.2.1.2 presents a model more suitable to such applications.
Note that an Interpress document is created at the workstation and
migrated to a file service at some point in time preceding the printing
need. Thereafter, the workstation issues a print request to the service
consistent with its user's interests. In response, the print service copies
the document directly from the file service, enabling production of the
desired hardcopy. This model offers many efficiency opportunities
including resource scheduling optimizations at the print service,
workstation productivity, and modular print document construction.
The authorization considerations of the workstation-resident document
printing model are straightforward. One reason for this condition is the
fact that the current set of XNS print services do not discriminate among
print request submitters. In other words, no print client requests are
rejected as a function of authorization. Were that situation changed in
the future, the arbitration of such requests would remain convenient as
the workstation possesses its current user's protection context. Requests
could thus be mediated based thereon against the access control rules in
effect at the print service. Secondly, the document to be printed is readily
accessible to the service through immediate contact with the supplying
workstation. The print client's authorization to copy the document to the
service is mediated internal to the workstation based upon the
properties of its current user. Thus, no particular accomodations for this
transfer need be made relative to protection under this printing model.
Such is not the case with respect to the file service-resident document
printing model. The comments above pertaining to mediation of the
print request are equally applicable in this instance. Document
accessability to the print service differs significantly, however. This is a
consequence of the workstation's temporal dissociation from the file
transfer. As one would reasonably expect, XNS file services apply
protection to the objects stored therein. Once a document is migrated to
the file service, all operations against which it is the target are mediated
according to the file service's protection model. This is currently
discretionary, implemented through access lists.49
The first order problem is to insure that the print client cannot
compromise the file service protection mechanism by dispatching a print
service to acquire a document for which the workstation user does not
have rightful access. In addition, the interests of the workstation user
need be insured in that the print service should be given access only to
the precise degree authorized by the client. This precludes such scenarios
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documents on the assumption that a workstation user has issued prior
blanket approval to that effect.
This application is specifically that motivating the proxy facility within
the XNS authentication mechanism. Many others of a similar nature
could also be described but have not been to the student's knowledge. In
any case, the thrust of the matter is to temporarily convey the print
client's identity to the service so as to facilitate satisfaction of the file
service's authorization mechanism on the document retrieval operation.
Such a solution effectively addresses the problems cited above in that a
print service operating under its requestor's identity is treated identically
thereas by the file service's access control mechanism.
A proxy thus represents the means by which any element within the XNS
architecture may delegate its identity to any other for a specified
interval. This is a unilateral decision exercised by a transaction initiator,
completely transparent to the recipient. Strangely enough, this element
of the authentication model intentionally facilitates impersonation on
the premise that it is in the best interest of system performance.
As is true of many software manifestations, the conditions associated
with this construct closely mirror those of well-established interpersonal
techniques. Legal mechanisms have been specifically established to
contend with the case where one party wishes to commission a second to
temporarily conduct business transactions on its behalf to some degree.
Such is the legal concept of an agent. Of particular note in that sense is
the fact that the transaction recipient must be presented proof of the
initiator's delegation of authority to the agent. Such a proxy represents
the agent's right to engage in transactions to the degree specified with
complete responsibility for the resultant effects transferring to the
initiator.
2.4.3.2.2 Model
The specific architecture of the proxy mechanism within
XNS'
strong
authentication model is offered in Figure 2.4.3.2.2. Message one is similar
to message three of the earlier model, consisting of an authenticator,
verifier and an added proxy field. Contained therein under protection
the initiator's private key is an expiration time after which the proxy is no
longer valid. This alone limits the agent's subsequent ability to
impersonate the initiator. The agent is also named in the proxy in order
to void its utility to any intruders.
The authentication service redeems the proxy in messages two and three.
Of significance are the observations that a proxy may be redeemed any
number of times within its window of relevance, to enable secure
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communications with any other principal. This message pair is analagous
to the first two of the original authenticator scoping model other than
the fact that the agent must first have established its identity with the
authentication service. The authenticator provided in this message
enables to service to constrain proxy redemption to only the party
named
therein. Other key differences are that the initiator is represented as A in
the authenticator and a second proxy cascading A's rights to B
further to
C is returned by the service. B then has the opportunity to employ
messages four and five to seek C's services as A, as well as to delegate C to
act as A's agent. Proxies are thus transitive nature, without constraint by
the initiator.
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3 Theoretical Development
This section represents a significant shift in the nature of the student's
thesis work. Thus far, the task has been to identify and integrate those
existing research contributions which comprise the foundation of
knowledge associated with the topic of interest. Incremental to that
accomplished end is the development element of research : enhancement
of the current state of affairs.
Innovation is thus the significant attribute of subsequent final report
content. Such contributions are divided rolewise between two major
deliverables according to the student's interpretation of the
recommended thesis development process. 1 6 Section 3.1 establishes a set
of available enhancement opportunities. These then represent the
requirements target against which architectural adjustment
recommendations are delivered in section 3.2.
3.1 XNSAuthentication Model Enhancement Opportunities
The candidate enhancements to be suggested in this report specifically
concern the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy model. Their identification is
the consequence of student analysis of the existing mechanism in light of
the body of established protection research presented in Section 2. Each
such opportunity is thus notable in that it is uniquely the product of the
student's thesis development. It is on that basis as well as the innovation
represented by the associated architectural development to follow that
the student contends his product qualifies as a Masters-level thesis.
A number of enhancement opportunities exist in the realm of the strong
XNS Authentication base model. As the effectiveness of the proxy
mechanism of interest is fundamentally dependent on that of the base,
they also need be identified. Such a dependency implies a natural order
to this discussion - base opportunities thus precede those unique to the
proxy. Recall in both instances that the authentication mechanism exists
solely to prevent the threat
of spurious association initiation. To be
effective, the mechanism must itself be immune to the distributed
systems protection threats outlined earlier.
3.1.1 Base
The architects of the strong XNS Authentication base model integrated a
broad variety of the techniques
introduced by the models of section
2.3.2. Among the most prominent of these are the concepts
of nonces,
timestamps, and authenticator caching. Yet in most instances, these
ideas have been modified as applied to the XNS model. While the
resulting
transformations are generally quite effective, a few are not.
This section highlights those of the latter flavor.
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3.1.1.1 Conversation Liveness Assurance
As noted through its introduction in section 2.3.2.3, cached
authenticators are a performance efficiency mechanism. They eliminate
the need to contact the authentication service as a precursor to each
conversation between a pair of principals. Among the associated benefits
of this reduction in message traffic are decreased channel contention
and conversation duration. In addition, denials of service consequent to
authentication service unavailability are avoided proportional to
conversation locality and the length of the caching window.
In the original cached authenticator model, a nonce is passed as
ciphertext under the conversation key with the authenticator as proof of
message liveness to the recipient. A timestamp fulfills the same function
in message 3 of the base XNS model.While this has the intended effect of
eliminating the handshaking associated with a nonce-based exchange, it
is not clearly an effective means of guaranteeing conversation liveness
given the complementary XNS architecture of which this is a component.
Timestamps are arguably both quite costly in terms of overhead and
technically complicated in terms of synchronization. Few, if any,
economical architectures have been identified by which distributed
clocks may be accurately maintained over any significant interval of time.
In fact, so illusive has been an effective solution that Mt. Sinai Hospital in
New York is reported to have adopted a solution whereby closed circuit
television monitors throughout the complex are set to a common
channel on which the image of an analog clock is broadcast.
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In addition to this generic trait of timestamps, it seems a particular
dilema exists associated with their use in this application. The magnitude
of the timestamp acceptability window should be no longer than that
required to accomodate expected subnet delays. Any slack time beyond
that represents an unnecessary period of vulnerability to the threat of
spurious association initiation as a consequence of message replay. This is
exacerbated in those XNS instanceswhere the underlying net is physically
Ethernet-based. Of course, such is the norm.
Two traits of Ethernet contribute to this situation. Due to the random
backoff nature of contention arbitration under the CSMA/CD scheme, it
is difficult to tightly-constrain the magnitude of the window without
incurring an unnecessarily large number of connection rejections. At the
same time, rapid message replay is quite feasible given the broadcast
nature of the subnet. Wide area networking further exposes the replay
vulnerability associated
with such a use of timestamps as it necessarily
extends the window.
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3.1.1.2 Identity Assurance
3.1.2
The message reduction efficiency associated with timestamp use in
authentication models was the XNS
architects'
motivation for its
utilization in the mode above. However, it was the secondary
justification for its original application to the model of section 2.3.2.4.
Denning and Sacco argued that their timestamp use eliminated the need
to employ the conversation key as part of the authentication exchange.
This was presented as a significant opportunity to strengthen the identity
assurance yielded by the mechanism given the potential of conversation
key compromise and subsequent prolonged exposure to impersonation
of either principal by the intruder. Therein also lies the motivation for
inclusion of the nonce-protected conversation key model in the survey of
section 2.3.2.
The base XNS model suffers this vulnerability given its utilization of the
conversation key to protect the verifier. This is consistent with the cached
authenticator model upon which it is based. No model has been
identified which both facilitates caching and prevents impersonation as a
consequence of conversation key compromise. This represents an
enhancement opportunity, short of which itwould seem caching need be
sacrificed in favor of greater identity assurance.
Many noble system architectural goals are achieved by the
Authentication-by-Proxy model central to this thesis development task.
The most fundamental of these is its ability to satisfy the immediate
need motivating its introduction: protected file-service resident
document accessibility to print services. Better still, such hardcopy
generation efficiencies are enabled through the proxy mechanism
transparent to all architectural elements but those participating in
authentication exchanges. In the minimum case, this includes the
authentication service itself and the party on whose behalf an agent is to
be dispatched. As the reference monitor abstraction demonstrates, such
scope constraint generally enhances protection mechanism assurance as
a consequence of such crucial quality factors as isolation and verifiability.
Run-time performance and system maintenance cost minimization are
additional beneficiaries of positive impacts consequent to such a
restricted solution. In addition, application generality extends proxy
mechanism utility.
Yetwere such complimentary observations the complete proxy story, this
research would rightly conclude short of the innovative development
required of thesis efforts. The remainder of this section accordingly
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identifies a number of categories in which the student contends the
proxy mechanism is insufficiently equipped to fulfill reasonable
expectations of a protection mechanism within the broader XNS
architecture. The basis for such claims rests with the student's analysis of
proxies against the established research contributions cited in section 2.
3.1.2.1 Identity Assurance
An authentication mechanism's sole purpose is to provide each principal
to a potential conversation confidence in the accuracy of the claimed
identity of its counterpart. Its ability to achieve that end is the primary
basis by which its utility is assessed. Such other quality factors as
performance efficiency are distant secondary concerns to the degree of
identity assurance afforded. 2
While the concept of a proxy does not fundamentally clash with this end,
the manner in which it has been architected into the XNS authentication
mechanism deliberately compromises the primary authentication goal of
identity assurance. As explained previously, a straightforward use of the
proxy option is visible to the initiator, its agent, and the authentication
service. Notable by its absence from this list is the recipient, who is
completely blind to the fact that other system elements may be
cooperating to establish an inaccurate identity for the party requesting
its services. Equally as likely is the fact that the claimed initiator identity is
correct. Consequently, the recipient may no longer place any confidence
in the accuracy of the claimed identity of its peer.
Interestingly, confidence in the recipient's stated identity is not
compromised as a consequence of proxy use. This is due to the
authentication service's use of the private key of the recipient to form
the authenticator. It is thus legible only to the actual recipient by
definition of its unique possession of the key by which the authenticator
may be returned to cleartext. The initiator's interests in confirmation of
its counterpart's identity are therefore unaffected by proxy application.
In spite of such sound assurance with respect to the recipient, initiator
impersonation alone represents a gapping protection shortfall. As
mentioned at the outset, identity is a significant element of access
control decisions in both mandatory and discretionary schemes. Initiator
identity is particularly significant to such decisions in a loosely-coupled
system organization such as XNS, where services must assume a defensive
policy in which they apply access controls locally according to their own
particular protection interests. Such a strategy is based on the lack of
assurance that incoming requests have been reliably preauthorized.
45
Enhancements to the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy Model
This extensive leverage which initiator identity applies to access control
decisions is precisely the property which is abused by the current proxy
mechanism under investigation. As the access control mechanism
assumes accuracy of the identity upon which its decisions are based, lack
thereof has the direct effect of proportionally compromising the
mediation effectiveness of associated references.
In the classical proxy sense, the recipient is aware of the fact that it is
dealing with a particular party as an authorized agent for the transaction
initiator. It may vary its behavior accordingly based upon such
distinctions. The XNS approximation to this model completely
short-
circuits the proxy process from the recipient's perspective - it is unaware
of the fact that it is not in fact dealing with the claimed party who is
authorized to perform the requested operation. The access control
mechanism is thereby extended beyond the explicitly defined bounds to
include decisions which serve the initiator's self-interests. Verification of
the consistency of such obscurely mediated-references against the stated
policy is a significant challenge. The additional reference monitor
properties of isolation and mediation are likewise weakened.
3.1.2.2 Authorization Scoping
Beyond the major opportunity for proxy facility improvement which
would accrue from reconsideration of the current impersonation
strategy, another set of slightly lesser importance deal with constraining
the delegation of authority consistentwith the needs of the operation to
be performed. That is, there is minimal accomodation in the current
proxy mechanism to scope the level of the agent's operation on behalf of
the initiator. The only provision to do so comes with respect to time
even this is minimally restricting as explained below.
A proxy is comprised in part by a timestamp chosen by the initiator. This
value represents the point in time after which the agent is no longer
commissioned to operate on the initiator's behalf. Selection of this value
is somewhat imprecise, as it reflects the initiator's assessment as to when
the operations to be performed by the agent will be completed. Such
estimation is likely to require the inclusion of a significant error factor
even were the initiator to be diligent in its minimization, an interest
counter to norm. Excessively large windows extend the threat of proxy
abuse, while insufficient windows prevent successful completion of the
delegated tasks. In either event, because the proxy is solely regulated by
time, there is no direct association to revocation upon completion of the
action of interest.
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Secondly, the timestamp solution is similarly suspect in that it applies
only to the trading of proxy rights for authenticators between the agent
and authentication service. Once the agent has acquired the
authenticator by which it may impersonate the initiator with a particular
recipient, it may continue to do so within the timeframe established by
the authentication service in the authenticator. This may, in fact, extend
beyond the window commissioned by the initiator. Alternatively, many
such authenticator acquistions may be required within the timeframe
necessary to complete the operation depending upon such factors as
operation scheduling and the relative magnitude of the authenticator
and proxy timestamps.
Due in large part to the reliance upon impersonation as the means of
proxy implementation, the delegation of initiator authority is nearly
completely operation-wise unconstrained to the agent within the
specified timeframe. Specifically, there is no delegation of identified task
responsibility. In fact, this attribute of the solution is by design in order to
accomodate the ability of the agent to assume more responsibility than
originally recognized but implicitly authorized. One instance in which
this is the case with respect to the document printing example cited
earlier exists when unidentified document retrievals are necessary to
resolve subitems referenced from the main document. An undesireable
side-effect of this strategy is to delegate immensely more authority to
the agent than is required to fulfill the initiator's intent. Such a blank-
check is also obviously counter to prudent protection practices in which
privileges are dispensed consistent with need-to-know in the
discretionary instance and clearance in mandatory schemes.
A third dimension exists against which the scoping of authority
delegation under the current proxy mechanism could be improved. It
seems the delegation of proxy authority is itself unconstrained. That is,
once the initiator appoints an agent, that agent may elect to further
expand the set of entities representing the initiator by naming any
number of additional agents therefor. Any subsequent agent may do
likewise. This authority distribution is constrained only by the timeframe
specified by the initiator in the original proxy by which the first agent
relationship was formed. Each such subdelegation of agent rights is not
even acknowledged to the initiator, much less confirmed. While the
authentication service participates in each subagent appointment by
virtue of its creation of the proxy by which they occur, it lacks any useful
criteria against which such requests could be meaningfully screened.
Given such ease of proxy reproduction, a single misjudgement as to the
credibility of a
prospective agent could be disastrous to the initiator as
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well as the recipient. In this aspect of proxy use, the initiator's fate is like
that of the recipient in the general sense - neither has adequate control.
3.1.2.3 Threat Immunity
It has been noted a number of times that an effective authentication
mechanism must itself be highly-immune to the protection threats
present in its environment. Such a property enhances the identity
assurance which the authentication mechanism provides the entities
which employ it. So also does it reinforce the foundation upon which the
complementary components of the protection architecture are
constructed.
As the proxy model is built upon the XNS authentication base, it is
fundamentally vulnerable to the attacks described in section 3.1.1,
namely authenticator replay and conversation key compromise. Among
the proxy model
architects'
prime challenges was to compensate for
these underlying shortfalls such that their mechanism would itself be
effective nonetheless. This goal was attained for the most part. However,
two exceptions to this statement have been identified by the student as
improvement opportunities. In both instances, the result is the
acquisition and execution of a proxy by an entity for whom the
associated delegation of rights was not properly authorized.
Figure 3.1.2.3.1 depicts a scenario by which any entity having physical
access to the standard proxy exchange sequence may grant itself the
rights being delegated. Notice that messages one through five of this
diagram are identical to those of the proxy model, while the rest deal
specifically with the intrusion. More accurately stated, the key
requirement to successfully compromise the proxy model in this manner
is the ability to record and replay the message by which the intended
agent first presents its proxy to the authentication service for an
authenticator against any recipient. Message two performs this function.
Messages three through five and recipient C have been represented in
the diagram in a light font to illustrate that they have no bearing on the
attack. In fact, agent B will likely complete its functions as planned
oblivious to the intruder's efforts.
This attack is focused on message six, which combines the threats of
replay and message
stream modification. It takes advantage of the
observation that the authentication service returns a secondary proxy
naming the identified
recipient as a subagent whenever a current agent
issues a valid request for an authenticator. Thus, intruder D need simply
record an effective proxy-for-authenticator trade request for the entity it
seeks to impersonate. It thereafter must only substitute its name in the
cleartext recipient field. The composite is then issued as message six.
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Interestingly, the authentication service relies on the fact that the
authenticator it returns in message seven is usable only by the party
which is a legitimate agent per the proxy and authenticator of message
six. This primary element of the message seven response is thus of no
value to the intruder. Neither is it the motivation for the attack. Notice
that the proxy attached to message seven is exactly what the intruder
sought, a usable ticket to impersonate the initiator. Messages eight
through eleven confirm this via the normal proxy application sequence.
The rogue proxy was attained under this scheme by deceiving the
authentication service to believe that the trade request eminated from a
currently valid agent. This is possible given the XNS model's fundamental
susceptibility to replay consequent to timestamp reliance. Additional
important contributing conditions include the modifiability of the
recipient field of message two and the indiscriminate usability of the
proxy returned in message three.
The proxy interception outlined above could be perpetrated by nearly
any entity in an XNS network given the underlying broadcast local area
subnets. It does require that a valid agent actually issue a successful
proxy-for-authenticator trade request, however. The second means of
proxy interception is more restrictive in that it may be attempted only by
a much smaller audience: an agent may intercept proxies subsequently
directed at the initiator on whose behalf it is commissioned. However,
the proxy need not be applied by the intended agent to enable the
intrusion in this instance. Figure 3.1.2.3.2 illustrates the substantive
exchanges comprising this scenario. Note in this case that the familiar
messages by which proxies are routinely applied are omitted in the
interest of legibility. Accordingly, only those essential to the compromise
underdiscussion have been included.
Message one commissions B as A's agent. B thereafter engages the
authentication service in a rather unique proxy-for-authenticator trade
request. This special case represents B's expression of its intention to
serve as A's agent in subsequent dealings with the authentication service
itself. One might consider this the ultimate violation of the demand for
identity assurance, yet it is not explicitly precluded to the student's
knowledge. Presumably, that effect would be implicitly achieved as a
consequence of consistent authentication service reliance upon the
private key of its intended conversant. The following intrusion
demonstrates that such is not the case in at least one instance.
B acquires the authenticator by which it may impersonate A in
conversations with the authentication service via messages two and
three. Message four represents D's intent to commission A as its agent.
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The proxy element of this transaction is thereafter traded for an
authenticator by which B may actually serve as D's agent via the normal
sequence of messages five and six. A key to intrusion success in this
respect is that B names itself as the recipient in this transaction. As in the
last scenario, the authenticator component of the authentication
service's response is neither usable or of interest to B - but the proxy is
unfortunately right on target. B is then ideally positioned to
illegitimately assume D's role.
Unlike the former intrusion scenario, timestamp shortfalls of the base
model are of no meaningful consequence in this instance. Rather,
allowance of entity impersonation with even the authentication service
combines with insufficient privacy of the cascaded proxy of message six
to form the primary loophole enablements. Indiscriminate usability of
the proxy as communicated from initiator to intended agent is also a
significant element of the attack.
3.1.2.4 Extensibility
The final class of improvement opportunities identified by the student
differ in an important sense from those described thus far. To date, the
items listed represent means of addressing significant existing
vulnerabilities in the XNS protection mechanism. Those which follow
pertain to ways in which the future expansion of the mechanism's
capability are constrained as a result of the present proxy architecture.
Current shortfalls appropriately warrant short-term resolution. The
student contends that relief from the extensibility constraints identified
herein is likewise critical given the rapid rate of technological advance
and the fundamental motivator thereof - customer demand.
In this respect, the most important area limited by the proxy architecture
involves the basic protection concern of accountability. The effectiveness
of such an ability to associate entities to the transactions in which they
participate is largely dependent upon both the accurate establishment of
entity identity and the reliable collection and analysis of audit trails of
interest.? Such a function has significant value with respect to attack
deterrence, detection, and recovery.
XNS'
lack of an organized, distributed audit mechanism is therefore a
major functionality shortfall whose solution is beyond the scope of this
work. This condition is relevant to this thesis only in the sense that it
accounts for the fact that there has yet to be a major objection cited in
association with the proxy mechanism's complete compromise of the
identity assurance upon which accountability is based. Without such a
logging ability, it matters little that the accuracy of the information
which could be captured is highly-suspect. Looking downstream
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somewhat, it is quite likely that the auditing side of accountability will be
addressed. At that time, the rampant impersonation condoned by the
proxy mechanism will be objectionable in this sense as well as those cited
insertion 3.1.2.1.
A second dimension along which the proxy model is limiting is that of
access control models. XNS presently relies solely upon discretionary
controls. The authority passing accomplished via the proxy mechanism
reasonably approximates such a need-to-know policy, in that the
initiator elects to temporarily distribute its rights to the agent based
upon some local criteria. Objections to this integration of the
authentication and access control mechanisms have already been cited
despite this apparent philosophical consistency.
The case against impersonation as the means of authority transfer
strengthens immensely given extension of the access control policy to
encompass mandatory rules as well. Coincidentally, this is the expected
trend of commercial system evolution within the next few years.
Accurate identity establishment is important in such an instance as the
means of clearance determination. This, in turn, is the basis of mediation
decisions rather than simple identity. More importantly, the concept of
authority transfer under such a policy does not accomodate initiator
discretion as to agent preference.
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3.2 Architectural Enhancements
Preceding sections of this document establish the need for specific
revisions to the model by which authority is temporarily transferred
between entities within the Xerox Network System. The extent of the
discussion by which this end has been achieved is indicative of the
magnitude of the challenge presented by the task of completely
addressing the requirement and architectural adjustment tasks
associated with this topic. The final research products of the student's
pursuit of that formidable goal are presented in this section.
Three main philosophical principles guided the production of the specific
architectural enhancements set forth below. These serve both to partially
establish architectural content validity and are evident in the
presentation style. Each also shares the notable trait of being conscious
attempts to deal with the complexity of the problem at hand in the
disciplined, effective fashion one would justifiably expect in a work of
graduate thesis scale.
The first of these is recognition of the fallacy of the single-solution belief.
This is clearly a necessary element of a researcher's mindset, having been
cited as one of the three great obstacles to innovation. 57 Those lacking
such an orientation pursue the identification of the one correct evident
solution which exists for each problem. Such blindness prevents the
sufficient investigation of potentially viable alternative approaches
which is a widely recognized characteristic of effective software
development activities, particularly that of design.
22 Application of this
principle to the work at hand is a motivation for the forthcoming
specification of three architectural models of varying intent rather than
the single option one might expect prior to consideration of this issue.
The student's second guiding principle builds upon the first in that
among the many potential
problem solutions considered one need
incorporate those of fundamentally different paradigms on the chance
that extension of the existing assumptions is insufficient to attain the
target growth increment.57,58 Realization that models are incomplete
system abstractions precedes this conclusion that the underlying
assumptions are themselves limiting factors of some magnitude to
solution effectiveness. This understanding manifests itself in the case at
hand in reconsideration of agency viability within a secure system, its
architectural coupling with the
authentication mechanism, and reliance
upon
XNS'
current base authentication model.
The familiar divide-and-conquer strategy by which complex tasks are
decomposed into solvable units is the remaining principle pertinent to
the following architectural
development. Interestingly, italso happensto
52
Enhancements to the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy Model
have been the first of the three applied in that it is the motivation forthe
enhancement opportunity analysis by which their respective interactions
and priorities were characterized as a prerequisite to model
development.
The consequences of the student's application of both these basic
general principles and those of lesser note to the particular XNS
authentication architecture enhancement task represents the significant
remaining concern of this document. Such is the role of the discussion
comprising the rest of this section.
3.2.1 Opportunity Analysis
In order to respond effectively to a set of identified architectural
inadequacies, such as those forming the XNS authentication model
enhancement opportunities of section 3.1, one need understand a
number of its attributes. Analysis of the set elements is required to
establish such familiarity. Consistent with the divide-and-conquer
principle outlined above, two of the most significant such relationships
of interest to the architect are the functional dependencies between
elements and their relative urgencies. Each perspective facilitates
efficient, visible ordering of pending architectural accomodations.
These particular attributes of the desired revisions thus represent the
next logical topic of thisdisclosure.
3.2.1.1 Interdependence
To be effective, task scheduling must accomodate the functional
interdependence relationships among the elements of a set of grouped
tasks, regardless of application. The purpose of this planning function is
to establish cause/effect relationships among the elements so as to
enable management of the removal of all causes for those of greatest
urgency. In fact, such information is itself a valuable modifier within
many nontrivial prioritization schemes. For simple or familiar activities,
functional interdependence is often either nonapplicable or obvious. In
other circumstances, conscious effort need be expended to establish such
a hierarchy. The latter case applies with respect to the enhancement
opportunities addressed by this thesis.
Figure 3.2.1.1 illustrates the dependence hierarchy within this set. The
message gleaned from this perspective of the opportunities is that the
four elements listed in the lowest layer of the diagram are fundamental
causals of those above. Note also that these elements are independent of
one another, being consequences of other circumstances described
earlier within the scope of their individual treatments. Likewise, the
opportunity listed in the
middle layer is caused in part by all of those
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listed below as well as others. Like those in the lowest layer, it partially
contributes to the existence of the opportunity listed in the top layer.
Closer examination of each opportunity illustrates that it is not generally
necessary to address all of the causal opportunities within lower layers in
order to remedy that of interest. Rather, various revision combinations
are sufficient. This point is illustrated by way of the alternate architecture
instances specified in section 3.2.3.
3.2.1.2 Prioritization
The respective benefit magnitude associated with each element of the
enhancement opportunity set is a primary consideration in both
architectural strategy development and evaluation of consequent model
sufficiency. This is based largely on the system consequences of the
identified existing condition. As noted in the preceding section, the
functional interdependence between enhancement opportunities is a
special case of this measure. From a priority perspective, those
opportunities on which there is heaviest dependence are weighted most
important. This is somewhat an inverse function on the hierarchy of
section 3.2.1.1, with those elements in the lowest layer considered
equally most urgent.
Figure 3.2.1.2 presents the benefit ranking among the enhancement
opportunities after all factors have been considered. Interestingly, it
turns out to be a reverse ranking of the functional dependence
relationships, with ties among those elements of the lowest layer
arbitrated. Notably, the opportunity to remedy identity assurance
shortfalls given the current proxy model as described in section 3.1.2.1
ranks far and away as the most urgent. Authorization scoping under the
proxy scheme rates a distant second, while positions three through six
are of only minor difference relative to urgency, yet once again much less
critical than correction of the authorization scoping concern. Within this
cluster, conversation liveness and identity assurance under the base
model are the most beneficial given their frequency and severity.
Liveness assurance rates slightly ahead of that of identity based on the
first of these factors. Threat immunity under the proxy model follows
given its dependence on these shortfalls, as well as its lesser likelihood as
a consequence of being limited to proxy use situations. Lastly,
extensibility is considered least urgent despite the importance of the
accountability and mandatory access
control facilities it concerns. This is
due in large measure to the associated need to expand those general
mechanisms independent of agency model resolution. An effective
resolution to the many proxy issues cited is a necessary but insufficient
condition relative to provision of those security facilities.
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3.2.2 The Agent Debate
The priorities established above indicate that the potential return on
architectural revision investment is very high simply given correction of
the noted inadeguacies associated with the proxy mechanism's identity
assurance and authorization scoping dimensions. However, the student
would be justifiably subject to a criticism of work incompleteness were
he to passively accept the premise that the underlying agent analogy is
the optimal means of manifesting authority transfer under these
particular circumstances. Such fundamental paradigm challenge is
consistent with the student's previously-stated thesis development
principles, general cautions regarding the potential inapplicability of
such extensions of human experience to computing technology, and the
ongoing debate within the security community precisely regarding the
agent application. 54,55,56,58
Elimination of the agent model from the XNS architecture would
certainly address four of the six authentication mechanism enhancement
opportunities, namely all those pertaining to proxies. Only those
comparatively minor items relevant to the base model would then
remain. This section considers the feasibility of such a potentially-elegant
approach.
Of course, successful completion reguires identification of at least one
alternate model satisfying those applications who are clients of the
authority-passing enabled through agency. As was the case in explaining
the motivation for agent inclusion in the XNS architecture, the file
service-resident document printing model presented earlier in section
2.4.3.2.1 serves as the instance of such applications referenced for this
purpose. Accomodation of those printing needs is necessary but
insufficient to prove general viability, while a demonstration of
deficiency would support a strategy of agent model revision as opposed
to replacement.
3.2.2.1 The Purist Perspective
The legitimacy of agents under protection models is emphatically
dismissed by those who perceive them as compromising existing
mechanisms.54,55 Loss of individual accountability, believed a necessary
deterence and detection mechanism, is the particular issue most
frequently raised. The higher-level consideration of individual
responsibility is thereby compromised
given an inability to associate
subjects to their mediated actions against objects. Coincidentally, this is
precisely the identity assurance
issue instantiated by the proxy
mechanism under study. The present challenge is to discern whether such
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an outcome is implicit in the agent model or simply consequent to its
form in the XNS authentication mechanism.
A frequently-discussed specific instance of the agent concept is that of
password-sharing. 54, 55, 56 Many protection professionals find it
objectionable from the perspectives mentioned above that password-
based identification mechanisms are insensitive to the infrequent sharing
of the information by which they discriminate parties. Such an exchange
between individuals outside system security controls amounts to the
discretionary creation of an agency relationship. Notably, this condition
is easily revocable. In addition, administrative security policies may be
instituted under which the password owner retains responsibility for all
actions performed under the associated identity as a deterrent to
irresponsible such disclosures given loss of individual accountability. Such
considerations remain objectionable under circumstances where
mandatory access control policies are warranted by the application's
security sensitivity. Nontransferable identification schemes are absolutely
called for under these conditions.
Nonetheless, theoretical computer security purists are unsatisfied short
of individual accountability within the system even under discretionary
access control policies. Their perspective is that sufficient leverage to
avoid the need for agency given existing access control paradigms is
available between organization of the subject/object spaces and
architectural mechanisms. In particular, the system should be organized
such that the initiator either represent itself with the recipients of its
transactions or delegate such rights to other entities via the discretionary
access control mechanism. In the instance of
XNS'
file service-resident
document printing application, this implies that the workstation either
directly participate in the document transfer from file service to print
service or that it establish read access rights against the files comprising
the document to enable some other entity to do so.
3.2.2.2 The Pragmatic Perspective
Unfortunately, a number of attributes of the existing Xerox Network
System prohibit either of these architectural options from being
realistically usable alternatives
to the current reliance upon the print
service as its client's agent in the file service-resident document printing
application. The specific nature of each such property is individually
presented in this section. The collective general theme illustrated is that
actual instances exist in which an agent is better equipped to perform
certain actions than is an authorized party given that it is held
accountable while doing so. Responsibility is thus focused externally on
the authorized party, while shared between the two on a secondary
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level. Among others, this principle routinely motivates the hierarchical
decomposition of human organizations.
3.2.2.2.1 Functional Efficiency
A number of opportunities for enhanced system efficiency were noted in
the introduction of the file service-resident document printing model.
Specifically, section 2.4.3.2.1 enumerates these as resource scheduling
optimization at the print service, workstation productivity, and modular
print document construction. None of these opportunities are
achieveable given an architecture shift resulting in the workstation's
first-hand participation in all underlying file transfer operations.
Consistent with
XNS'
client/service transaction model, all direct
interactions between the workstation and print service must occur within
the window required to register the print request. However, this
represents a severe constraint to the resource balancing algorithms at
the print service when the document transfer is included in the exchange
set. In fact, the ability to indefinitely postpone the print service's such
data acquisition is among the main attractions of document migration to
a file service in the first place.
This observation does not apply to demand printing applications,
however. In such an instance, the document is file service-resident largely
as a means of long-term on-line retention. Short-term workstation
resource usage is optimized under this scenario. The unique negative
dimension of directly involving the workstation in document transfers to
the print service given this scenario pertains to unnecessary
communications bandwidth consumption given the redundancy of the
operation. Of course, workstation processing capacity is also needlessly
expended undersuch an approach.
As noted earlier, printable documents are represented in the Interpress
page description language within the XNS architecture.48 in the simple
case, an entire such document is represented by a single file. This
constraint is relaxed in the general case, however. In fact, the printable
form may span many files across any
number of file services. The
language supports this capability via indirect reference primitives





language.59 The ability to nest such externally referenced content many
levels further adds both to construction flexibility and its corresponding
complexity. Production publishing is the primary customer application of
this organizational capability.
The two functional inefficiencies described thus far are amplified under
instances of such a nested organization. Subsequent sections elaborate
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upon significant attributes unique to this complex case. Note that this
condition may be encountered in association with either document
printing model given the inclusion of indirect file references within the
top-level printable document involved. The potential range of agent
paradigm applicability isthusexpanded proportionally.
3.2.2.2.2 Delegation of Intent
This application serves as a vivid instance in which the party engaging the
services of an agent seeks to delegate the global intent of the objective
to be achieved rather than its specific component tasks. The logical
motivation driving such an open-ended approach is that the transaction
initiator is not knowledgeable as to the complete composition of the
implied task list, whereas the agent is. Such a situation reguires the
initiator to rely upon the agent's inherent trustworthiness under the
particular circumstances. A degree of assurance in this respect is typically
attained via a dual-pronged risk management strategy, with compromise
prevention based primarily upon examination of the prospective
agents'
public record complemented by an auditing-based detection mechanism.
This is precisely the scenario as regards the nested printable document
example introduced above. By design, the workstation-resident print
client is unaware of the complete file set comprising the document it
reguests a print service to image on its behalf. System flexibility is
enhanced by limiting such scope management to include only direct
references. Conseguently, the service must dynamically parse incoming
documents and their component segments to establish this overall
context. This profile is thereafter employed to acguire and merge the
pertinent content prior to imaging. Such rolewise responsibility division
is consistent with the familiar performance tradeoffs associated with the
late binding principles of programming language theory.
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One possible architectural alternative which is consistent with these roles
calls for the print service to notify the client as to the file set it reguires to
continue throughout the course of such parsing. The workstation could
then participate directly in the necessary transfers between various file
services and the print service conditional upon the reservations expressed
in the prior section. A crucial property of this
approach is that the scope
of such data transfers is established by the print service. In addition, the
workstation has little means of measuring the completeness of the file
list beyond trust in the service and
analysis of the reguests over time. This
candidate model benefits as a conseguence
of the minimal simplification
associated with its elimination of the need
for any formal authority
transfer between the workstation and
print service. On the other hand, it
is essentially
eguivalent to an agent situation in terms of threat
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susceptibility given the initiator's lack of specific familiarity with the
rights set it possesses and need leverage to complete the intended
objective.
3.2.2.2.3 Discretionary Access Control Model Fidelity
One might alternatively propose that the workstation-based print client
be eguipped with the capability to traverse the nested printable
document structure, thereby invalidating the model above in which it is
less informed as to the specific task set than the agent. This could be
accomplished in any number of ways, all of which sacrifice the flexibility
achieved through the execution time binding employed at present. This
tradeoff aside, the workstation could then confidently avail the print
service to the precise file set involved.
Various potential models exist by which this end could be achieved, one
of which is the familiar first-hand involvement of the workstation in the
data transfers. This approach dovetails nicely with one of the means by
which the workstation could apprise itself of the document structure,
dynamic parsing of the individual elements much as the print service
presently operates. A notable associated advantage is its transparency
relative to the existing document creation and description architecture.
While authority transfer is unnecessary in this scenario, its unattractive
properties relative to functional efficiency are guite significant as
outlined above. Those reservations are supplemented in this instance by
the many negative effects incurred through document parsing at the
print client.
Another available approach would be for the print client to temporarily
expand the read access which it possesses against the individual elements
of the file set to include the print service. This seems a viable strategy at
first-blush given its appropriate use of the existing discretionary access
control mechanism to implement the desired authority transfer.
Unfortunately, existing need-to-know models such as that employed by
the XNS file service reserve such authority expansion for the object's
owner. Thus, while the print client has read access to each file comprising
the nested printable document by definition, it does not necessarily have
the ability to transfer
those rights to the print service. Paradigm
modification to enable elements of the various access classes to
unilaterally include
other subjects in this fashion would be both
significant and undesireable, invalidating the fundamental owner
concept by which responsibility is presently
focused.
A slight variation on this theme is also worth discussion. Given such read
access and complete knowledge of the file set, the print client can create
redundant copies of those objects for which it is not the owner. Read
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access for each data set could then be established on behalf of the print
service. Such data duplication is a significant expense. Incrementally,
model complexity could be reduced at an associated similar resource cost
by copying all files in the set as opposed to only those for which it was
necessary to satisfy the discretionary access control model. An additional
nontrivial issue pertaining to the need to rescind print service access
upon completion of its specific short-term service also need be addressed.
This is much easier in the instance where all files are copied, as the print
service could also be granted delete access in anticipation of its
responsibility to exercise such rights upon print completion. Otherwise, a
synchronization mechanism need be instituted by which the workstation
would be notified of the event. Construction of an effective mechanism
of this type is no simple task given the intermittent client availability
assumption of the underlying transaction model. All things considered,
this option seems no more satisfactory than any of the other frail
identified paradigm substitutes for agency.
3.2.3 Alternative Agent Models
The preceding exploration firmly establishes the insufficiency of existing
access control paradigms to accomodate those conditions under which
the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy architects expected their agent
mechanism to be most applicable. The effort expended in considering
such a fundamental issue is not without merit in spite of this outcome,
however. Affirmation of the value added by inclusion of an effective
agent mechanism within the architecture is itself a prominent conclusion
of thiswork.
That being the case, the candidate solution set has been narrowed to
encompass only those models by which the XNS architecture could be
revised to support agency while responding to the identified
enhancement opportunities. This section describes the student's
contributions to that set. Where useful, the file service-resident
document printing application continues to serve as the instance by
which viability is demonstrated in a specific, limited sense. General utility
is also promoted given the student's inability to identify cases proving
the contrary.
Three such models are presented, consistent with the acknowledgement
that none is defensible as best under all circumstances. Particularly
relevant tradeoffs pertain to the completeness of enhancement
opportunity
satisfaction against the tolerable degree of architectural
modification. These respectively represent the most relevant associated
aspects of benefit and cost to be considered in this case by those
responsible forthe long-term evolution of the overall XNS architecture.
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In terms of content, the models themselves vary as a conseguence of the
paradigm shift principle. In this second-level instance, coupling of agency
to the authentication mechanism is reconsidered as is reliance upon
XNS'
current base authentication model. The result is a pair of models under
which agency is provided in conjunction with authentication as in the
current model. Incrementally, a third direction is specified by which
access control serves as the authority transfer vehicle for agent
relationships. The evident cost of such architectural adjustment is
balanced in each presentation with that of the model's success in
capturing the potential enhancement opportunities.
3.2.3.1 Authentication-Coupled
As demonstrated by the current facility, it is possible to minimize the
amount of architectural revision reguired to provide an agent
mechanism given its coupling to that of authentication. Section 3.1.2
enumerates many attractive aspects of such localization. In addition, the
momentum to incorporate such modifications into the XNS
authentication scheme also seems to exist at the present time as
evidenced by the recent promotion of adjustments to facilitate the
associated need for secure post-authentication conversation traffic. 52
Finally, it is possible to remedy most of the identified shortfalls of the
present agent facility within the scope of such an authentication-based
mechanism.
The primary exception to this statement applies to the ability of the
initiator to effectively constrain the scope of its
agents'
actions consistent
with the intended authority delegation. As the opportunity analysis
illustrated, such proxy authorization scoping ranks as the second most
beneficial among the six. This significant reason combines with those
associated with the principles of consistency in functional decomposition
to form the main inadeguacies associated with such a pairing.
In light of these common characteristics, a pair of models are presented
below. The first represents the minimal change to the present state given
its reliance upon the existing XNS base authentication model. This
constraint is dropped in forming its associate in order to capture a larger
share of the enhancement opportunity set.
3.2.3.1.1 Preserved Base Model
Perhaps surprisingly, a significant percentage of the potential benefit
associated with the identified enhancement opportunities may be
captured simply through relatively
minor adjustment of the present XNS
Authentication-by-Proxy model. This is largely a consequence of the
model's amenability to




Enhancements to the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy Model
assurance under the proxy model. The primary constraint implied
throughout this discussion is that base authentication model
modification is prohibited other than as specifically required to support
the agent mechanism. As stated previously, this is a potentially valid
practical consideration.
Consequently, the existing base model's character is preserved in the
model of Figure 3.2.3.1.1.1. As demonstrated, no adjustments have been
incorporated relative to the two enhancement opportunities specifically
associated with the base model. This is not a particularly damaging
constraint relative to the goal of specifying a vastly improved model,
however, as the benefit associated with each was quantified through
earlier analysis as relatively low. On the other hand, it does present a
challenge with respect to the task of capturing the other opportunities
influenced thereby. The discussion to follow illuminates the specific
manner by which the completeness of proxy extensibility and threat
immunity opportunity enhancements are correspondingly reduced.
The only required revision to the preserved base model is the addition of
a fourth value to the authenticator This is the "agent
for"
field,
positioned following the initiator's name. Semantically, the field is used
to designate the name of the principal on whose behalf the initiator is
serving as an agent. Accurate communication of such information to the
recipient rectifies the identity assurance problem under the current
scheme. Under the new model of Figure 3.2.3.1.1.2, the authentication
service employs the authenticator to notify the recipient as to both the
identity of the party with which it is directly interacting and that on
whose authority it seeks to perform. The service provides assurance of
information validity given the identity which the agent conveys through
message two. Given such relationship visibility, the recipient is once
again in control of its local access mediation decisions. This applies also to
the mandatory access control extensibility
opportunity. In the base case,
where no agent relationship has been established, the field is null as
designated by the
"A"
symbol. This is the familiar situation in which the
initiator's own authority is employed in access
control decisions.
Accountability is also facilitated
given such an adjustment. Note also the
addition of an audit trail of proxy trade requests to be maintained by the
authentication service. This supports the specific accountability of agents
to the initiator in two respects. In the first, authority scoping is facilitated
at a minimal level in that the
initiator now has a mechanism by which it
may determine
the set of recipients with whom its agents have
transacted business. This is a very-high level authority abuse deterrence
and detection mechanism in which the
authentication service acts also as
a notary. Authority scoping is also
enhanced by this facility with respect
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to an agent's transitive passing of proxy rights. As above, abuse of such a
powerful responsibility is less likely given the greater visibility accrued
from this reliable auditing capability.
As a final adjustment to the model relative to authorization scoping, it is
recommended that the authentication service constrain the
authenticator expiration time to be the minimum of its typical window
length and that of the initiator's designated proxy's expiration. Though
not visible in the information communicated between parties, this
treatment enforces the initiator's designated intent to the degree
possible.
Two items are specified by which immunity from the identified threats to
which the current proxy model is suspect may be largely achieved. The
first, encryption of the recipient's name under the conversation key in
message three, prevents an intruder from acquiring a proxy as a
consequence of a message modification and replay attack. This is a
relatively inexpensive operation given the constrained nature of the
object to be translated. Notably, this does not prevent an intruder from
perpetrating successful denial of service attacks by replaying valid
messages within the replay window to which the base model remains
suspect. However, the audit trail facility specified above captures
evidence of such occurrences for subsequent analysis and detection.
The second threat to which the current proxy model is suspect is
preventable as a side-effect of the identity assurance adjustment
described earlier. Specifically, the authentication service is now in
possession of sufficient information to insure that it does not translate a
proxy for any party but that explicitly designated, including any agents
thereof. In addition, one might reasonably argue that the authentication
service reject attempts by any party to establish an agent relationship for
transactions against the authentication service itself. This is unnecessary
relative to any of the identified enhancement opportunities, but
presented as a practical consideration given the implicitly sensitive
nature of such interactions.
The shaded areas of Figure 3.2.3.1.1.3 graphically indicate those
opportunities captured by these revisions to the current Authentication-
by-Proxy model. Included among these is that ranking highest in priority
as well as a portion of that pertaining to the second most useful. This
seems a very high return on the
minimal investment described. Thus, this
model is the most attractive of the three offered by the student if overall
architectural stability is of high concern relative to security assurance
completeness. Such is potentially the case if maintenance cost
minimization is an engineering goal.
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3.2.3.1.2 Enhanced Base Model
A second, slightly more radical, model adjustment option expands the
scope of consideration to include the underlying base authentication
mechanism. While one could elect to patch its current shortfalls, the
evolution of more effective models since that of XNS was conceived
suggests that the prudent strategy is to select the most attractive of
among those which have emerged. Thus, the nonce-protected
conversation key model of section 2.3.2.5 is the student's choice.
The key property of that model favoring its selection under these
conditions is excellent effectiveness in establishing conversation liveness
and identity assurance, two fundamental weaknesses of the current base
XNS mechanism. These are respectively consequent to reliance upon
timestamps and the conversation key within the authentication
exchange. Alternatively, the candidate employs nonces and the
recipient's private key - methods defended earlier as more effective.
Expertedly, such a benefit increment is not free of cost. Among the most
notable such expense is greater transaction traffic between the principals
and authentication service. This is due both to the elimination of
conversation key caching and the handshaking associated with nonce use
but not timestamps. Denial of service attacks given authentication
service unavailability also proportionally increase in likelihood. In
addition, such modification of fundamental system facilities implies
nontrivial maintenance cost distributed across many of its elements as
well as potential configuration compatibility issues in operating
environments.
The figures on the opposite page illustrate the proposed enhanced base
authentication and agent models. As in the former proposal, the sole
modification of the base model required specifically due to the agent
application is inclusion of an "agent
for"
field within the authenticator.
This again designates the principal on whose behalf the transaction
initiator seeks to operate with the recipient. In the base case, this field
remains unused, consistently represented by the
"A"
symbol.
This agent model is otherwise very similar to that presented in the prior
section, including the addition of proxy trade transaction auditing
responsibility to those of the authentication service. A significant
difference pertains to the lack of the need to encrypt the recipient field
of this message, number four of the agent model. This is due to the
inherent liveness assurance of the message under this base model. For
the same reason, the denial of service attack to which the first model is
suspect may be prevented in this instance. This is an important
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perfomance tradeoff against the increased message traffic identified
above.
A slight disadvantage of this model against that of the existing base XNS
model pertains to authority scoping under the agent model.
Replacement of the timestamp in the authenticator with a nonce,
though attractive with respect to liveness assurance, also shields the
recipient from the window within which the proxy is valid. Thus, while
the authentication service insures that the proxy is valid at trade request
time, no effective means exists thereafter by which the recipient may
terminate the conversation consistent with initiator's stated intent.
Figure 3.2.3.1.2.3 demonstrates the security assurance benefit potential
associated with agency under the enhanced base model architecture.
Consistentwith its higher expense, the model yields a marked functional
improvement over the preserved base model option. It is important to
note that the two are equivalent with respect to identity assurance in the
agency architecture, the highest priority opportunity. Likewise, each is
constrained with respect to extensibility given its coupling with the
authentication mechanism. In this instance, improvement potential exists
with respect to the frequent authentication exchanges which occur at
the base level. This direction is quite attractive in light of such
observations, given availability of the necessary moderate maintenance
resources.
3.2.3.2 Access Control-Coupled
Has the best been saved for last? Once again, the answer to this question
depends upon the reader's definition of quality. An affirmative reply is
warranted if security assurance and system extensibility rank very high on
the customer's fitness for use criteria list. Otherwise, either of the two
solutions described thus far will prove quite satisfactory. In this section,
the student's identification of viable enhancements to the XNS
Authentication-by-Proxy model is completed as a consequence of yet
another application of the paradigm shift principle. In this case, the
authentication mechanism is discarded as the underlying agent
architecture vehicle. Rather, protection's traditional authority passing
mechanism, access control, is supplemented with agent-specific
provisions. Such a strategy enables the parallel independent evolution of
authentication and access control mechanisms by which efficiency of the
integrated protection facility may be optimized. Maintenance cost and
configuration compatibility once again represent the cost elements of
the decision process. This direction represents both the most expensive
and beneficial of the three.
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The student's model by which an agent mechanism might best be offered
in conjunction with the access control mechanism is illustrated in Figure
3.2.3.2.1. A number of attributes of the model warrant discussion priorto
consideration of the particular exchanges by which it is executed. Note
first the introduction of an "agent
administrator"
entity within the
architecture. As the name implies, its role is to provide a centralized
source of administrative expertise regarding those transactions in which
agents participate. Specific tasks of which this objective is comprised
include the retention of context regarding the security clearance of
prospective agents by which transaction initiators can be accurately
apprised of their statically-established trustworthiness. The agent
administrator also verifies the legitimacy of a proxy relative to the service
requested of the transaction recipient by a purported agent. Lastly, the
administrator serves the notary role seen before with respect to proxy
trade request auditing.
A second noteworthy property of the model is the use of standard
authenticators in association with application-dependent message
content. The specific authentication model employed is an orthogonal
issue to that of the agent architecture. It simply performs the pure
authentication task of principal identification. Given the interplay of the
pair with respect to the overall protection scheme, the nonce-protected
conversation key model of section 2.3.2.5 is recommended for the same
reasons it was employed as the basis of the enhanced base model above.
This is not a necessary condition for model adoption, however.
Alternatives modify integrity of the messages comprising the exchange
proportional to their respective effectiveness.
The first order of business under the access control-coupled agent model
is forthe initiatorto convince itself thatthe prospective agent is credible.
This discretionary decision is supported by preregistering agent clearance
with the agent administrator. The initiator obtains this certification
information at the outset of the agent sequence via messages one and
two. This is compared against local requirements to determine the
acceptability of responsibility abuse risk. As the initiator remains
responsible for the actions of its agents under each of these models, it is
very much in their
interest to pass such authority with care. That is
particularly so in the
instances at hand, in which intent is delegated
rather than specific access-controllable tasks. This exchange effectively
supports that need.
Figure 3.2.3.2.2 presents the component fields of these messages and all
others within the model. In this instance, the exchange is much like the
standard initial exchange between initiator and authentication service.
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Note that the reply is encrypted under the private key of the initiator to
guarantee both privacy and source integrity, with timeliness proven by
inclusion of a nonce. Finally, the agent's name within the reply enables
detection of message stream modification attacks.
Upon selection of a sufficiently-trustworthy agent, the initiator engages
that party in carrying out the objective of interest via message three.
Note that the proxy passed is both unforgeable by and of little
immediate use to the agent given its protection under the initiator's
private key. Fields within the proxy include an identifier by which actions
sanctioned under it are to be logged for accountability purposes. The
agent authorized under the proxy is also designated along with the time
at which the initiator's rights delegation is to be rescinded much as in the
existing model. The primary advantage in this instance is the increased
granularity of such determination, as explained below. Notably, a simple
rights set is also included in the proxy. These are intended to be
consistent with those administered under the vanilla access control
mechanism. The initiator is thereby enabled to constrain the type of
operation delegated even though the specific objects against which such
rights apply remain unspecified as required.
Message four is forwarded from agent to recipient when it seeks to
perform a service contributing to the initiator's objective. The recipient
may immediately choose to reject the request on the basis of the proxy.
Alternatively, it would ascertain the validity of the proxy presented by
forwarding it to the agent administrator along with the context of the
requested service. The agent administrator first checks the validity of the
claim that the proxy originated at the initiator by decrypting it under the
private key of record. It then insures that the named agent corresponds
to the party who presented the proxy to the recipient. The currency of
the proxy is verified next, based upon a
comparision of the agent
administrator's clock to the expiration time specified. Finally, consistency
of the operation being requested by the agent with those authorized
under the proxy is confirmed. The results are confidentially forwarded to
the recipient, along with a nonce demonstrating liveness. So also is the
transaction logged by the agent administrator for accountability
purposes, as represented by the data dictionary's "ProxyUseLogEntry".
Given success above, the recipient mediates the references implied under
the service request given its local policies. It thereafter should log audit
trail information according to standard, as yet unspecified, practice.
Finally, the agent is apprised
of the application-dependent results of
requested services.
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The agent administrator requires access both to the private key of each
system entity and mechanisms by which they are applied to cleartext. The
administrator itself needs to be trustworthy for this reason, as well as to
reliably perform its notarization function. Finally, it must maintain
accurate clearance information with respect to entity trustworthiness
under agent conditions. Each of these roles are very similar to those of
the authentication and clearinghouse services. Thus, the function should
minimally be allocated to the same processor as are those elements.
Tighter coupling would also be acceptable contingent upon a modular
organization. Finalization of this consideration is best disposed of under
the guise of a detailed design activity.
It is somewhat an understatement to note that this direction represents a
radical departure from the current Authentication-by-Proxy mechanism.
Fortunately, it is also a very attractive architecture from many
perspectives including the degree to which it captures the target
enhancement opportunities. As Figure 3.2.3.2.3 illustrates, it is nearly
complete in this respect. The sole exception to that statement is in the
continued inability to explicitly prevent abuse of the delegated intent
with respect to time and specific objects. As discussed when considering
the viability of agents within the architecture, this is an unavoidable
consequence of an organization in which the agent is more informed as
to the specifics of the task to be performed than is the authorized party
on whose behalf it operates. Accordingly, abuse detection mechanisms
have been identified as a prudent riskmanagement technique.
Additional advantages of this model accrue to the individual parties
involved. For instance, the initiator benefits as a consequence of such
architecture attributes as visibility of agent track records, auditing
capabilities as authority abuse deterrents, and the ability to constrain the
transfer of access rights within the bounds of the objectives to be
performed. Similarly, the recipient regains control of access mediation
decisions given the visibility of agency relationships. In terms of
implementation strategy, need-driven extensibility is facilitated given
the architecture of a centralized agent administrator. In addition,
decoupling authentication from authority
transfer mechanisms regains
architectural consistency. Finally, applications within which agency is a
meaningful concept may migrate towards its use, while others need not
change. Such scope constraint is also desireable from the perspective of
verifiability
- a fundamental security assurance property.
Along these lines,
Figure 3.2.3.2.4 illustrates a typical example of the
access control-coupled
agent model within the file service-resident
document printing
application. Most significant of among its many
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attributes is the ability of the print client to constrain the authority
delegated underthe proxy to encompass only those operations requiring
read access. As an instance of model sufficiency under the primary
conditions motivating provision of agency within the architecture,
so
also does it focus verification attempts with favorable results.
69
Enhancements to the XNS Authentication-by-Proxy Model
4 Conclusions
This thesis report describes a number of innovative products of the
student's development activity. First among these is the identification of
many significant improvement opportunities which exist within the
current Authentication-by-Proxy model of the Xerox Network System.
This claim is backed by an extensive body of previously-published
protection literature. More importantly, a number of architectural
enhancements by which these opportunities can be captured are
provided in response to the recognized need. Consistent with the
acknowledgement that no single solution is defensible as best under
circumstances of such technical and administrative complexity, three
viable enhancement options are offered. Cost and benefit factors
beyond the realm of this work should be employed as the ultimate
discriminators within this set. Finally, the demand for a disciplined agent
management mechanism within a distributed system such as XNS was
resoundingly affirmed in the course of these first-order pursuits. This
outcome is itself surprising in that it is counter that expected by the
student at the outset of this thesis.
4.1 Unanticipated Problems
Only one notable unpleasant technical surprise was encountered in the
course of this work. One might already have surmised on the basis of
length that this effort incorporated many more concepts than was
projected at the time of topic selection. Fortunately, much of the
underlying research was performed in the course of associated graduate
studies in anticipation of some thesis pertaining to protection within
distributed systems. Nonetheless, such volume amplified the requirement
for skilled thesis committee members. On this count, it would have been
difficult to fare any better than in this experience. Aside from that,
incremental development effort was the familiar primary response to
this recognition.
4.2 Residual Opportunities
The most obvious latent activity to be pursued is the transformation of
the specified architectural models into operational systems. This is a
significant objective given the number of associated complex elements
for which detailed design, coding, testing, and installation remains.Were
that not the case, the student surely would have pursued those tasks
within the umbrella of this work. In fact, many individuals could keep
themselves challeged for a fair amount of time in this way. The most-
likely practical strategy by which this would occur is within the research
and development confines of the Xerox Corporation. This is an outcome
both of their vested interest in realizing the potential opportunities
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described and unique direct exposure to the resources necessary to do so.
Of course, the ideas directed in this context at the Xerox Network System
apply in large measure to other distributed system architectures as well.
Such generalization opens the possibility of many related research
avenues.
In addition, effort remains minimally estimated as of a graduate project
scope by which formal methods of protocol validation could be applied
to the models produced herein. This is an emerging area of study which
has recently attracted the participation of some of the protection field's
leading researchers. 53
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The prevention of unauthorized use of an object by a
subject.
A data structure associated with a protected object
which describes the individual access rights of its aspiring
subjects.
The set of object references for which a particular subject
possesses sufficient privilege.
The ability to accurately associate operations to the
parties concerned.
An intrusion resulting in an unauthorized modification
of protected system objects.
Formalized policies and procedures guiding organization
practices.
A neutral subject to whom a transaction initiator
temporarily grants its own access rights as a means of
facilitating subsequent object references conducted on
the initiator's behalf for which the third-party likely lacks
sufficient authority of its own.
see public key encryption
The corroboration that a peer entity is the one claimed.
The network entity employed to corroborate the claimed
identities of two mutually suspicious yet
transaction-
eager principals. A second notable function of this
service is to facilitate the reliable distribution of
encryption keys to those principals seeking protected
connections.
Ciphertext generated by the authentication service by
which a transaction initiator may demonstrate its
identity to a targeted recipient, as well as to privately
communicate the associated conversation key selected
by the authentication service.
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The granting of rights, which includes the granting of
access based on rights.
The likelihood that a system is operational within a
random time period.
A data transmission technique in which the electrical
signaling on the medium directly reproduces the digital
form of the information.
A communications subnet in which all nodes receive each
message transmitted thereon as a consequence of
reliance upon a shared transmission medium. These are
then filtered at each node according to a specified
destination address.
A scheme in which a data item is retained in local storage
beyond the timeframe of its initial use on the
assumption that it will be referenced again shortly
thereafter. This is a memory-reference efficiency
technique, which has been applied to the authenticator
within some authentication schemes.
An unforgeable ticket, which when presented can be
taken as uncontestable proof that the presenting subject
is authorized to have access to the object named in the
ticket.
A data structure associated with a subject which
describes its respective access rights to objects. A series of
capabilities.
An information transfer path through the
communications subnet.
Data whose semantic content has been temporarily
suppressed as the by-product of encryption.
The distributed naming service within the XNS
architecture. Its role is to provide a mapping between
the names of elements in the distributed system and
their various properties. Address translation is the most
common public service it provides. Its most notable
contribution to the XNS authentication model is the
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protected retention of the private keys of named system
elements.
Intelligible data, the semantic content of which is
readily-available.
The entity within the XNS architecture which initiates a
service request. As XNS services implement ISO
application-layer protocols, such an entity employs those
conventions to issue its requests.
The exchange of information between parties.
communications security: Mechanisms which protect traffic on the






covert storage channel :
covert timing channel:
Those elements of the network architecture whose
devoted mission is to reliably transmit messages from
sender to receiver. Layers one through three serve this
role in the ISO/OSI protocol reference model.
The property that a protected object is made available to
or disclosed only to authorized subjects.
The unique, typically authentication service generated,
private key to be employed by the initiator and recipient
for protected segments of their connection.
The degree to which the system operates in accordance
with its stated requirements.
A communication channel that allows a subject to
transfer information in a mannerthat violates the
system's security policy.
A covert channel that involves the direct or indirect
writing of a storage location by one subject and the
director indirect reading of the storage location by
another subject.
A covert channel in which one subject signals
information to another by modulating its own use of
system resources in such a way that this manipulation
affects the real response time observed by the second
subject.
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Data which is transferred to establish the identity of an
entity.
The discipline which embodies principles, means, and
methods for the deterministic transformation of data in
order to prevent its disclosure and/or to detect its
modification.
An abbreviation for the channel access arbitration
technique introduced by Ethernet. Any node may
attempt to transmit on demand under the scheme, with
contention avoided by the transmitter first sensing
whetherthe channel isalready in use. Propagation
delays may induce collisions despite this precaution.
These are thus detected and abitrated by random
backoffs at the respective senders. Such behaviors
motivate the scheme's full name, carrier sense multiple
access with collision detection.
see data flow diagram
A graphical system modeling notation emphasizing the
flow of information between components. Another
notable attribute of the notation is its strength at
partitioning multidimensional systems, thereby
decomposing a complex problem into a series of
workable ones.
A translation by which ciphertext is returned to the
unique cleartext from which it originated as a
consequence of a matching encryption operation.
The prevention of authorized access to an object or the
delaying of time-critical operations.
Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of,
a data unit that allows its recipient to prove its source
and integrity.
A model by which object access is mediated as a function
of the identity of subjects or the groups to which they
belong. The controls are discretionary in that a subject
with certain access rights is capable of passing that
permission on to any other subject.
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distributed system: An operating system which executes on multiple
independent processors transparent to its users. Such
processor-independence is particularly noticeable with
respect to the file system, program execution, and
protection. Contrast this organization with that of a
networked system.
document: Information which has been structured to facilitate its
effective communication between individuals. Such an
object may be represented through various media,
electronic or otherwise.
documentmanagement: The set of operations which combine to enable the
organization of information for interpersonal exchange.









The degree to which the resources required for
execution are affordable to the customer.
The cryptographic translation of data to produce
ciphertext.
The encryption application strategy in which message
transformations are performed only at the sending and
receiving nodes, transparent to intervening switches.
The baseband local area networking scheme introduced
by Xerox research, and subsequently formally specified
along with Digital Equipment and Intel.
The degree to which system resources may be
conveniently scaled according to the demands of the
using organization.
An application service in the XNS architecture which
exports conventional filing operations to other entities
on the network. Access to the individual files residing in
the service by network clients is protected under a
discretionary policy.
A bidirectional exchange between communicating
network entities employed to assure one or both parties
of such conversation attributes as liveness.
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The pretence by an entity to be a different entity.
The principal who first sought to establish the
conversation requiring authentication.
The property that an object has not been altered or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
The primitive operations and services which a layer of
the network architecture exports to higher layers. Data is
physically communicated across such a boundary.
An instance in which an object has been accessed in a
manner inconsistent with the authorization of the
subject.
A subject who's object references are beyond the scope
of its authority.
The International Organization for Standardization is a
worldwide federation of national standard bodies
whose many products include the OSI protocol reference
model and its security addendum.
A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of
encryption and decryption. Possesion thereof is thus
regulated as a means of protecting the confidentiality of
cleartext and/or the integrity of ciphertext.
see authentication service
see local area network
The encryption application strategy in which messages
are individually transformed along each circuit between
adjacent switches on the path from sender to receiver.
A network which is intended to enable a great number
of varying processing
elements to exchange large
amounts of data at high speed over limited distances.
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An MIMD computing architecture in which the control
scheme is distributed. That is, a number of potentially
heterogeneous machines combine to form a system with
local activities and interaction frequency determined
largely by the dynamic needs of the respective elements.
The degree to which software remains productive
throughout the postrelease phase of its lifecycle.
A model by which object access is mediated as a function
of the sensitivity of its contents and predefined subject
clearance.
see impersonation
The specialized computers comprising the
communications subnet which route messages along the
individual circuits forming the physical communications
media between the sending and receiving nodes.
A mechanism which synchronizes the access to abstract
data types transparently to its clients.
see networked system.
An interconnected collection of autonomous computers
which interact at the explicit direction of their users.
Contrast this organization with that of a distributed
system.
An individual computer system which executes processes
having a need to interact with those resident on another
node through an intervening network.
A non-repeating number employed in a handshaking
sequence to insure the property of reply timeliness to the
exchange's originator.
A trusted third-party with whom transaction
demographics are recorded to corroborate potential
subsequent claims by the principals.
A shared-resource against which client references are to
be controlled by the protection mechanism.
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private key encryption :
The discipline which embodies principles, means, and
methods for the uninvertible deterministic
transformation of data .
The Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model
defines a vendor-independent layered network system
architecture.
An intrusion resulting in an unauthorized disclosure of
protected system objectswithout an associated change
in their state.
Processes executing in respective nodes which are
interacting according to the protocol of a specific layer
of the network architecture.
Mechanisms directed at insuring the integrity of the
workforce, such as redundant responsibilities and
assignment rotation.
Mechanisms designed to insure the preservation and
availability of an organization's physical resources.
The two suspicious parties employing the authentication
service to assure themselves of the accuracy of their
associate's claimed identity, as well as the timeliness of
their exchanges.
An application service in the XNS architecture which
exports document printing operations to other entities
on the network.
An key used in conjunction with a symmetric encryption
algorithm. The system consequence of this attribute is
that the single key must be possessed both by the
message initiator to form the ciphertext and its recipient
to recover the cleartext.
The class of encryption algorithms in which a single key is
employed both to encrypt and decrypt messages. This is
referred to as a private key.
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The mechanisms and techniques which control subject to
object references. Often used synonomously with the
broader sense of security.
The rules and conventions by which peers interact.
A token which demonstrates the approval of an entity to
temporarily delegate its authority to a second entity, its
agent.
The globally-accessible key used in conjunction with an
asymmetric encryption algorithm which is employed by
any party wishing to privately pass data to its owner or
to confirm the integrity or authenticity of data received
from its owner.
The class of encryption algorithms in which two keys are
employed, referred to as the public and secret keys.
Either may be employed to encrypt cleartext. Having
done so, the complementary key must be applied to
successfuly decrypt the resultant ciphertext.
The principal with whom an initiator wishes to establish
an authenticated conversation.
An access control concept referring to the abstract
machine which mediates all accesses to objects by
subjects based upon predefined relations to which it
alone has access.
The degree to which the time between system failures is
acceptable to the customer.
Reissuance of messageswhich were recorded from a
prior legitimate conversation.
Denial of participation in all ora portion of a
conversation.
see mandatory policy
The key used in conjunction with an asymmetric
encryption algorithm which is known only by its owner.
Consequently, it may be employed to recover
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information passed privately to its owner by other
parties or to pass information to others with assurance as
to its source.
The mechanisms and techniques which control who may
use or modify a computer system or the information
stored therein.
An integer variable accessable only via operationswhich
register an acquisition or release request as a means of
synchronizing client access to a set of shared resources.
A node in the XNS architecture from which services are
exported. Servers are configured with unique resource
capabilities or functional roleswhich are most efficiently
availed the overall system via such physical
concentration.
An element of the XNS architecture which exports ISO
applications-layer protocols.
A scheme by which a pair of interacting principals
identify themselves to one another in a manner which
has little immunity against potential protection threats.
A scheme by which a pair of suspicious principals assure
themselves that each iswhom they claim to be in a
mannerwhich is intended to be highly-immune from
protection threats.
A client of a shared-resource who's use is controlled by
the protection mechanism.
see private key encryption
Coordination of the relative timing of shared-resource
use among its many clients.
A potential means of violating the security policy.
The processing bandwidth component of system
performance: output per unit time.
The distributed time synchronization mechanism within
the XNS architecture. Its role is to serve as the master
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clock againstwhich those local to the many processors in
the network are coordinated.
A message field in which a time/date value is specified.
The associated semantics vary by protocol, though it
generally depicts the current time at the initiator's node
at the instant of message issuance.
The degree to which the system user finds its operation
to be effortless.
The degree to which it is possible to certify correctness.
Ciphertext produced by the recipient in the XNS
authentication model which demonstrates response
liveness to the initiator.
see wide area network
A communications network which spans significant
geographical distance. AWAN is typically comprised of
local clusters interconnected by point-to-point channels.
An XNS system element whose purpose is to locally
service the routine tasks of an individual.
The network architecture which forms the distributed
computing platform of Xerox Corporation's office
system product set. This is also the architecture in which
the particular authentication paradigm central to the
student's thesis is a component.
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